Do It Yourself

Legal Documents

   
     
     
 

-- Case Briefs --


Contracts


Civil Procedures


Criminal Procedures


Torts


Constitutional Law


--Practice Tests--


Contracts Test 1


 --Answers --


Answers to Contracts Test 1


--Notes & Outlines--


Contracts


Civil Procedures


Con Law


Agency & Partnership


Equity


Evidence


The Federalist Papers


Upload Files


 


New WhiteSmoke 2009


LSAT Preparation

 


Read WhiteSmoke's Testimonials


Advanced Writing Solution for Professional Results . Limited Time Offer! Get Now!


Whitesmoke all-in-one tool 

 

 

Law School Site

 
 

EQUITY I  

I.      INTRODUCTION

 

Definition of Equity:

 1) fairness, impartiality, evenhanded dealing

 2) The body of principles constituting what is fair & right; natural rights

 3) The recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to particularcircumstances

 4) The system of law or body of principles originating out of the Ct. of Chancery & superseding the common & statute law when the two conflict

 5) A right, interest, or remedy recognizable by a ct. or equity

·        equity is a system of justice administered according to fairness rather that strictly formulated rules.

·        it was developed for those cases where the law cts. would not provide a remedy but where, in justice, there ought to be one

·        examples are where you have cause of action where the legal remedy (usually money damages) will not suffice….but you still deserve to have some type of remedy.

·        equity fills the gap….equitable remedies act upon the person, forcing him either to do or refrain from doing a particular act

·        equity – encompasses remedial relief

·        remedy -  is the goal of litigation / a solution / provides relief to injured

·        damages are a remedy

·        “ubi jus ibi remedium” – where there is a right, there is a remedy

·        equity is designed to take care of a specific relief / cases where the law is insufficient / includes injunctions

·        equity takes up where the law ends

·        remedies are substitutions for money for the damages

·        equity seeks to make the person / thing whole again

·        equity remedies are up to the discretion of the judge / chancellor

·        just because a person has been harmed, does not mean there is an equitable relief available

·        complete relief vs. substitutional relief – equity seeks complete relief vs. remedies/damages seek substitutional relief

·        to require specific performance, must show there is no other remedy / there is no adequate remedy at law / there is no substitution for lost item

·        the purpose of the Ct. of Equity – fairness / seeking fairness

·        equity’s relationship to the law is that of supplement – it completes, perfects the relief, so one gets a full relief

·        equity seeks individualized justice

·        “relative culpability” – looks at how the other party acted vs. ct. of law, which only needs to satisfy the elements of law

·        ct. of law looks at the facts, where ct. of equity looks at individual’s actions & culpability

 

(A)    Rights & Remedies

1) equity seeks to provide individualized justice (common law treats everyone

          same)

2) equity seeks to provided a remedy when there is not adequate remedy at law

 

(B)     Relief Sought In Equity (basis types)

1) substitutional – damages (these substitute for the harm caused)

2) specific – when the legal remedy is inadequate (injunctions)

3) other – ejectment (recover possession of land) & replevin (recover possession

                   of chattels)ttels)

 

(C )    Application of Equitable Relief

·        The distinction between legal & equitable remedies retains vitality for two main reasons:

1) the right to a jury trial depends on the remedy being legal

          2) purely equitable relief gives great discretion to the judge to evaluate

                    the equities of the parties

·        Cts. frequently refer to the following 3 sources of guidance:

1) natural law & common law maxims

2) public policy; and

3) civil law / positive law

 

Riggs v. Palmer use of equity to prevent murderer from taking victim’s estate under will

·        D murdered grandfather to ensure he would not change his will leaving D large part of estate

·        the will statutes did not make a provision to prevent a murderer from taking under the victim’s will – therefore, under statute, D could still take under the will

·        Ct. said statutes must be construed to give the effect to the legislative intent & sometimes an equitable construction may be contrary to the letter of the law

·        ct. found the legislation’s could not have intended for murderer to recover property under the will based on technicality of law

·        it is a common law principle that no one may profit by his own fraud, take advantage of his own wrong, or acquire property by his own crime

·        ct. ruled that a will procured by fraud may be set aside & a person can no more obtain property through murder than he could have by outright force or fraudulent inducement

·        Maxim – “one who comes into equity must come with clean hands”

·        D’s conduct was criminal, so ct. refused to allow him to enjoy the fruits of his crime

·        Here, there was no adequate remedy at law

 

Graf v. Hope Building Corp. equitable balancing of fault & hardship

·        interest payment wrongly computed & D failed to cover shortage through inadvertent omission

·        Ct. may not dismiss a complaint if the cause of action arose from D’s inadvertent omission

·        there is no defense to the suit

·        P demonstrated a lack of generosity….but the ct’s job is not to impose generosity

·        the mortgage was neither oppressive nor unconscionable….D’s errors and omissions do not justify relief….not for ct. to exert compassion….that is for the parties to do or not do

Weinberger v. Romero-Barceloit is the federal ct’s discretion whether to order injunctive relief

·        Navy fired ordnance in water off Puerto Rico…w/o the proper permit….but the testing was not causing any tangible damage to environment

·        an injunction is an equitable remedy & should be granted only when it is essential to protect property against otherwise irremediable injuries

·        the basis for injunctive relief is irreparable injury & inadequacy of legal remedies

·        even when irreparable injury is shown, an injunction is not a matter of right…the ct. must evaluate the public interest & may w/hold relief in the public interest

·        a federal judge has JD to ensure compliance w/ a statute through injunctive relief…but he has not duty to do so under any & all circumstances

·        TQ – Ct. looked at the purpose of the act….injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, not necessarily a guaranteed right….does not exist as a matter of right….is at the discretion of the judge, chancellor to decide

 

Nature of Equity

Equity questions usually involve three basic issues:

(1) Is there a right to equitable relief? 

·        equity will act only where there is an injury to a particular type of right that cannot be remedied by an action at law

(2) Is equitable relief practicable?

·        the equitable remedy sought must be effective & enforceable

·        equity will not act where it does not have the power or the means to carry out its orders, or where it would be difficult to supervise performance

(3) Are there any equitable defenses that prevent the issuance of equitable relief?

·        because equity is always interested in doing justice, it will not act where it would be unfair to do so

 

The essential concern of equity is to grant certain types of remedies.

 

Principles That Underlie the Granting of Equitable Relief

Availability of Equitable Remedies:

Equity acts only where there is no adequate remedy at law.

Remedies at law may be inadequate because:

·        damages cannot make a P whole because the subject matter of the litigation is unique

·        damages are speculative & uncertain

·        multiple & successive suits would have to be brought in order to get relief at law

·        insolvency of the D makes the judgment at law uncorrectable

·        irreparable harm results from the D’s conduct which simply cannot be fully compensated by a money judgment

 

Equity Acts Upon The Person:

·        personal JD is necessary since the usual equitable remedy is to compel a person to do his duty in a specific case

·        today, equity cts. will exercise quasi in rem JD

 

Enforcement of Equity Decrees

Equity will not take JD where there are no practical means to enforce its decree.

1) Ct. must have power to force compliance

·        the only means for keeping a noncomplying D in line is w/ the power of contempt

·        where contempt is insufficient to coerce compliance, equity cts. are powerless to act

2) Ct. must be able to determine whether there has been proper compliance.

·        equity ct. must be able to determine to its own satisfaction whether the task to be performed under the terms of the equitable remedy are, in fact, properly done

 

Equity Applies Where A Property Right Is Present

·        general rule is that equity will grant relief only where a property right is present

·        some cts. today will grant relief where no property right is present – here they only require a “protectable interest”

 

Remedy In Equity Discretionary

·        the question of whether an equitable remedy should issue is ant the sound discretion of the ct.

·        there is no absolute right to equitable relief

 

 

 

Right To Jury Trial

·        as a general rule, equitable claims are determined by a judge; there is no right to a jury trial

·        if a party (1) joins several separate equitable claims & legal claims that have certain issues in common or (2) states a single claim & demands both legal & equitable remedies….she is entitled to have the common facts or the single claim tried before a jury

·        Example: P sues D for infringement of a trademark & seeks money damages at law & injunctive relief in equity….both P & D are entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether D infringed the trademark

 

Answering an Equity Questions:

·        just remember what the equity ct. is trying to do, and pose to yourself the three questions above

·        keep in mind the “whys” & “wherefores” of equitable relief

 

II.    HISTORY OF EQUITY

(A)    Origins of Equity

·        by end of 13th century, three separate cts. existed in England; King’s Bench, Common Bench or Ct. of Common Pleas, & the Exchequer

·        each ct. had its own sphere & by middle ages, P often had a choice between the three cts.

·        the cts. developed the common law….so called because it was the law common to all persons

·        to begin an action, P had to go to the chancery or an administrative department of the exchequer to obtain a writ

·        although theses cts. were est., there was still a reserve justice in the King

·        those who could not get relief elsewhere presented their petitions to the King seeking a remedy

·        the Chancery began to handle these numerous requests, & this is how the judicial powers of the chancellor developed

·        by the 14th century, two sides of the ct. of chancery had developed – a common law & an equity side

·        if a case could not be adequately handled by a ct. of common law, the chancellor issued a writ for the case to be heard by a chancery ct.

·        remedies at common law were usually limited to damages; if a P required other relief, he would have to seek it in a ct. of chancery

·        the cts. of chancery had the power to enforce decisions because their writs were in the name of the King & refusal to obey was contempt of the King

 

(B)     Maxims of Equity

·        Equitable principles & notions can be expressed in the form of maxims

·        There are two types: enabling & restrictive

·        Enabling Maxims – ex: “equity will not suffer a wrong to be w/o a remedy” – pertains to the exercise of equitable JD

·        Restrictive Maxims – ex: “he who comes into equity must come w/ clean hands” constrains the ct. to deny equitable relief

(C )    Equity In The United States

·        most states est. cts. w/ equity JD by the early 19th century

·        Al. abolished ct. of equity in 1992

·        today, equity & law have been merged in most states in form

·        the substantive fights relating to the type of trial & remedy remain distinct

 

(D)    Equity Acts in Personam

1) Decree in Equity Commands a D to Act in a Certain Way.

          a) equity tells a person to act in a certain way (affirmative order) or

                   forbids her to act in a certain way (prohibitive order)

          b) historically, this was in contrast to a judgment at law, which did not

                   require a D to act or refrain from acting, but rather, simply

                   declared the law as applied to that particular case

 

2) An In Personam Judgment Imposes Personal Liability on the D.

          a) the equity ct. must therefore have personal JD over the D

          b) the D who fails to act as equity orders, has disobeyed a personal

                   directive.  Equity can enforce its decrees by coercing appropriate

                   conduct, generally by the use of contempt proceedings.

 

3) Enforcement Through Contempt Proceedings

J.R. v. M.P. (1459) enforcing ct. order through use of contempt powers

·        a ct. of equity may not nullify an obligation in order to enforce its order

·        the ct. may not cancel the obligation owed to P

·        the chancery’s only power is to enforce its decrees is contempt

·        there was no adequate remedy at law; the ct. acted on the person, not the property

 

4) Equitable Defenses

·        the grounds for equitable relief against judgments usually involve fraud, accident, mistake, surprise, or duress

·        Rule 8(e) of the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure – provide a party may state all claims or defenses whether they are equitable or legal

·        Some equitable defenses may bar equitable remedies w/o limiting legal remedies:

-         the clean hands defense may preclude the remedy of specific performance w/o affecting the availability of the remedy of damages

-         caveat: the conduct that constitutes unclean hands may bar the P from seeking relief at law under a defense by another name, or she may be precluded from bringing another action at law by res judicata rules

 

(E)     Merger of Law & Equity

1) Federal Law – law & equity were merged into one procedural system in Fed. Ctws in 1938

·        the distinction of the right to trial by jury at law has been preserved

·        where the substantive law that has developed at law differs from that in equity & a conflict occurs, law yields to equity

·        equitable relief is usually specific, whereas legal relief is generally substitutional

·        equitable relief remains discretionary; legal relief is usually a matter of course

 

2) State Cts. – law & equity have also merged in most state cts.

·        legal & equitable causes of actions may be joined in the same proceeding, and legal & equitable defenses may be presented in the same action

 

Strank v. Mercy Hospital… - equity in US today

·        equity does have JD to enforce a contractual obligation where there is an inadequate remedy at law

·        equity has JD not only for prevention of acts contrary to law but also for the enforcement of obligations where damages either cannot be calculated or are an inadequate remedy to redress the wrong suffered

Mutual Life Insurance v. Newton recognition of equity decrees at law

·        D used land to secure mortgage to secure bond…resulted in foreclosure…

·        Ct. held a suit in equity on the foreclosure of a mortgage does bar a subsequent suit at law on the underlying obligation secured by the mortgage

·        the mortgage is security for the underlying debt; the action to foreclose the mortgage is a final decree & bars subsequent action on the original debt

·        the doctrine of res judicata provides that a cause of action once finally determined on the merits, cannot be litigated again in another proceeding, either before the same ct. or another ct.

·        this is true whether the first adjudication is in a ct. of law or ct. of equity

 

Joinder of equitable & legal claims

-         in a merged system of law & equity, all actions must be pleaded & all defenses must be raised

-         if the ct. reaches the merits of the cased, subsequent suit is barred

-         counterclaims: compulsory – arises out of the same t/o or common nucleus of operative facts; permissive – does not arise out of the same t/o or common nucleus of operative facts

 

(F)     Right to Trial by Jury

7th Amd. – right to trial by jury exists in actions at law, but not in actions in equity

 

What happens when both legal & equitable claims arise in one case?

·        State – generally, where legal & equitable issues are joined, either party may request a jury trial on the legal issues

·        Federal – the right to trial by jury has been extended to those legal issues which are merely incidental to the equitable causes of action

7th Amd. – in suits at common law, where amount in controversy exceeds $20, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved

·        two requirements for a jury trial are:

-         an issue triable by jury must be present

-         demand must be timely

·        demand must be in writing and timely

 

In Equity – triar of fact will always be a judge/chancellor

 

Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers… v. Terrytwo pronged test to determine whether a suit involves legal rights

·        truckers transferred and lost seniority….sought jury trial in order to seek monetary damages in form of backpay

·        ct. held an employee seeking backpay from his union for breach of its duty of fair representation has a right to a jury trial under the 7th Amd.

·        as in the 7th Amd., phrase “suits at common law” refers to suits in which legal rights, including those created by statute, are determined as opposed to suits in which only equitable rights are recognized

·        the merger of law & equity has not eliminated this right

·        TQ – the determination of whether a suit involves legal rights requires examination of:

1) the nature of the issues involved (compared w/ 18th century equity actions in England) and

2) the remedy sought (whether it is legal or equitable in nature)

·        in order for a party to be entitled to a trial by jury – must show:

1) there was something in 18th century law like your case (nature of

          action)

-          was this the type of action a Chancellor would have heard or is this an action heard by a ct. of law in 18th century

2) nature of remedy sought – the general rule is whenever a party is

          seeking money damages, it is an action at law / not universal

·        collective bargaining was illegal in the 18th, so P’s action was unknown then

·        because P’s claim includes both equitable & legal issues, the 1st test is not determinative

·        P’s seeks a remedy of compensatory damages

·        An action for monetary damages is generally considered legal relief, but there are exceptions:

1) restitutionary damages are considered equitable

2) a monetary award that is incidental to injunctive relief may be equitable

3) Congress has specified that backpay awarded against an employer under Title VII is “equitable relief”

·        because the remedy P’s seek is legal in nature & the nature of the issues involved are both legal & equitable, P’s are entitled to a jury on all the issues in their suit.

 

 

III.   POWERS OF THE EQUITY COURT

 

(A)    ENFORCEMENT OF EQUITY DECREES

 

The public interest in orderly govt. requires that orders issued by cts. having personal & subject matter JD be respected & complied with.

·        while the principle is beyond dispute, the JD issues in specific cases are often contested

 

Notice – a prerequisite to enforcement is notice of the order

·        minimum requirements – due process requires a person be notified of the action before she can be held responsible for compliance

(1) such notice must proceed from a source entitled to credit &

(2) it must inform D clearly & plainly what is required under the order

The Cape May & Schellinger’s Landing RR v. Johnsonformal service not required

·        city council receives telegram advising ct. order issued directing them to refrain from passing  a certain ordinance….they disregarded & passed anyway

·        a ct. order does not have to be formally served to be binding on the party it is directed against.

·        a ct. order that is in force must be obeyed; it cannot be challenged by disobedience, even if it was improvidently granted or irregularly obtained

·        D did have actual knowledge of order, although not formally served…

·        Actual notice is sufficient, so long as the notice proceeds from a source entitled to credit & informs D clearly & plainly from what act he must abstain

Lord Wellesley v. Earl of Morington persons bound by the decree

·        an agent of D disobeyed an injunction restraining D from cutting timber

·        a ct. will interfere where a person not specifically enjoined by the ct’s order willfully assists in the act forbidden by the ct.

·        Batley, as agent of D, knew of D’s duty & should have taken care not to commit any acts in violation of the injunction

 

Contempt Against Nonpartiesthe only time a person not a party may be

punished is when she has helped to bring about the thing forbidden,

which is that act of the person enjoined.

·        thus, the nonparty, to be punishable for contempt, must have either abetted the D or been legally identified w/ D; knowledge of the order is not sufficient

·        representatives, agents, servants, etc. of party bound by decree must also obey it

·        anyone acting in concert to get around the ct’s decree – collusion

Rigas v. Livingston persons not acting in collusion not bound

·        P’s fruit stand torn down after order issued

·        parties not acting as agents or servants of the D nor in collusion w/ them, but w/ knowledge of the existence of the order, are not bound by an order enjoining the D’s

·        persons not connected in any way w/ the parties to the action are not restrained by the order of the ct.

·        the order was directed at certain city officials, and as general rule, such an order cannot be directed at the “whole world”

·        the activity is not necessarily prohibited, but that activity when engaged in by that party or parties

United Pharmacal Corp. v. US

·        P had preliminary injunction to prevent release of drug into interstate commerce – D sent it anyway

·        a party who is not in active concert or participation w/ the party enjoined cannot be held in contempt for violation of that JD

·        a party who is not ID w. the party enjoined as its agent, servant, subsidiary, tool, or alter ego, cannot be said to have acted in concert or in participation w/ the enjoined party in violation of the injunction

US v. Hall exception to the common law rule

·        ct. entered judgement requiring local school board to complete desegregation of schools….lead to racial unrest…ct. then ordered students from engaging in violent behavior…limited access to school parents, students, etc….D, not a party to original case, violated order & was arrested

·        a person who is neither a party nor bears any legal relationship to a party can be punished for criminal contempt for violating a ct. order designed to protect a judgment on the original case

·        the general common law rule that a ct. of equity has no power to punish for contempt a nonparty who violates an injunction solely in pursuit of his own interests arose in cases in which the 3rd party’s activities could not disturb the adjudication of rights & obligations between the original parties

·        here, D’s activities threatened the parties to the original Mims case, the P’s right to attend an integrated school

·        a ct. has power to render a binding judgment, and may protect this power by punishing for contempt

·        this principle is the basis for in rem injunctions, which are binding on all persons who come into contact w/ property that is the subject of a judicial decree

·        school desegregation orders, like in rem orders, are particularly vulnerable to disruption by nonparties, & cts must be able to protect their judgments

 

Collateral Bar Rule

·        once a ct. determines that it lacks JD, rulings or orders made by it other than a dismissal or transfer are void

·        unless the claim is patently frivolous, every ct. has the JD to determine its own JD

·        in other words, the ct. can properly exercise judicial power long enough to rule on whether it has JD

·        one who defies the ct. & willfully refuses obedience does so at his peril

·        Effect of Disobedience willful disobedience of a ct. order w/o any attempt to challenge the order through appropriate procedures is punishable by criminal contempt even if the order is later set aside on appeal or the basis of the action becomes moot

·        However, if the order is shown to have been erroneously issued, the judgment of civil contempt can be set aside

(1) sentences for criminal contempt are for the purpose of vindicating the

          authority of the ct.

(2) civil contempt is ordered to either coerce the D into compliance or

          compensate the P for losses sustained

US v. United Mine Workers of America disregard of appealable order

·        D’s striked even though the P, owner of the mines, obtained a temporary restraining order against strikes

·        a party may not disregard an appealable ct. order issued pursuant to ancillary (supplementary) federal JD

·        when there are elements of federal JD & ct. order is issued supplementary to the main suit, the order must be obeyed under penalty of contempt even if the order can be appealed

·        D acted on its own peril when it disobeyed order

·        the ct. had JD to issue a temp. restraining order while it tried to determine its won powers under the NorrisLaGuardia Act

·        even if the ct’s order was erroneous, it must be obeyed until it is reversed by orderly & proper proceedings

·        if later set aside, the violation is still punishable by criminal contempt….but conviction for civil contempt would be reversed

·        this decision illustrates the basic function of the contempt power – the application of judicially ordered force to coerce compliance w/ ct. orders

·        one limitation on the ct’s contempt power is the requirement the ct. have JD.…this means that the ct. must at least appear to have both personal & subject matter JD before its contempt citations will be upheld

·        when ct. issues an injunction, the ct. must be specific as to the parities, the activities restrained or prohibited or proscribed for performance

·        personal JD is waivable, subject matter JD is not

Walker v. City of Birmingham disregard of unconstitutional ordinances

·        civil rights protestors conduct protest in violation of an unconstitutional injunction…held in contempt

·        ct. does not have to consider the constitutionality of the unchallenged underlying ordinance which led to the criminal contempt citation

·        there is no constitutional freedom to ignore est. procedures of law, and D’s were therefore properly held in contempt

·        the ordinance the temp. restraining order prohibiting D was later found unconstitutional…however… the rationale of this case, that the proper procedure to subvert an injunction is to subject it to review rather than disobey it, is still valid

Void & Invalid Orders

(1) valid orders – an erroneous but jurisdictionally invalid order must be obeyed

          until reversed or set aside on appeal; punishable by criminal, but not civil

          contempt

(2) void orders – injunctions entered by cts. lacking subject matter JD are void &

          are not enforceable by civil or criminal contempt; exception is if the claim

          of subject matter JD is not frivolous or insubstantial

(3) void orders involving the 1st Amd. – injunctions violating the 1st Amd. are void

          but violation of those orders subject the violator to criminal contempt

          unless the order is transparently invalid

 

Civil & Criminal Contempt – willful disobedience of an order of a ct. of equity

          constitutes contempt of ct., but punishment depends on the circum-

          stances

(1) criminal – proceedings must comply w/ the requirements for criminal proceedings generally, such as burden of proof, right to counsel, jury trial, etc.

·        the proceedings are separate from the underlying proceedings; generally used to punish the contemnor for disobedience or vindicate its authority

(2) civil – normally an adjunct to the underlying case;

·        generally used to coerce compliance or to assist a complaint

 

International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell

  • mining companies filed suit, alleging unfair labor practices
  • before cases came to ct., 2 parties settled
  • st. of Virginia & 2 counties still get $54 million even though ct. dismissed case
  • issue was whether the fines were civil or criminal
  • there are two major types of contempt; criminal & civil
  • the distinction between the two turns on the character & purpose of the sanction involved
  • if contempt sanction is remedial & for the benefit of the complaint – civil
  • if it is punitive & to vindicate the authority of the ct. – criminal
  • if civil – still responsible for paying the fines
  • if criminal – have to have a trial w/ jury & decide if still liable for money & is entitled to due process

Both contempts may involve fines & imprisonment

  • in civil contempt imprisonment, an attempt is made to coerce the party to perform…if he acts, he is released….carries the “keys of his prison in his own pocket”
  • in criminal contempt imprisonment, a fixed sentence is imposed for an act of disobedience…it is not coercive
  • a contempt fine is considered civil & remedial if it either coerces the D into compliance or compensates
  • a flat unconditional fine is criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance

Civil vs. Criminal

Civil – no jury required….preponderance of the evidence sometimes clear &

          Convincing proof…direct…fine is small, less severe

Criminal – jury trial….reasonable doubt…right to counsel….cross examination

 

What must be shown in order to show the sanctions are Civil:

1)     coerces compliance or

2)     it is compensates victim / wronged party for harm suffered

If it is prohibitive – tends to be criminal

In re Yengodirect & indirect contempt

  • attorney goes on vacation and fails to appear in court
  • ct. held an attorney’s unexcused absence from trial a direct contempt for procedural purposes
  • where the explanation is clearly inadequate, the need to maintain the authority of the ct. should predominate & the offense should be treated as a direct contempt
  • where there is a good faith excuse, the offense will be treated as indirect contempt
  • Summery Contempt Test:

(a)              act or omission must occur in the presence of the ct. so that no further evidence need be adduced for the judge to certify to the observation of the contumacious behavior and

(b)              the act must impact adversely on the authority of the ct.

Pounders v. Watson

·        summary contempt convictions of counsel have been held where the following characteristics were present:

(a)   it took place in the immediate presence of the trial judge

(b)  it consisted of breaches of decorum & disobedience in the presence of the jury upon trial

(c)   the conduct was professional in that it was of lawyers

(d)  upon a course of conduct lont-continued in the face of warnings that it was regarded by the ct. as contemptuous

  • one contumacious act could be enough
  • here the trial ct. expressly found that respondent’s questions in open ct. had permanently prejudiced the jury in favor to her client & that the prejudice cannot be overcome
  • the trail ct’s findings that respondent’s comments had prejudiced the jury, together w/ its assessment of the flagrance of the respondent’s defiance support the findings of the need for summary contempt

In re Littlecriminal contempt

  • D was forced to defend himself in district ct. and made closing remarks suggesting bias on part of the ct….judge for D in contempt for remarks
  • a trial ct. may not convict a party of contempt for merely accusing the ct. of bias
  • merely accusing the ct. of bias in summation does not constitute criminal contempt.
  • There is no evidence to show that D's comments actually disrupted  the ct’s proceedings
  • In order for such statements to be contemptuous they must constitute an imminent threat to the adm. of justice
  • D’s behavior posed no such threat & his conviction must, therefore, be reversed

 

Writ of Assistanceis a remedy for enforcement of ct. decrees that applies only to real property.  It is a mandatory injunction that dispossesses the occupant of real property & gives it to the person entitled to possession.

Hamilton v. Nakai

  • dispute over rights to a Indian reservation….P’s sought a writ of assistance in district ct. to enforce their rights of joint tenancy
  • ct. was found to have proper JD over this matter
  • the power of the ct. to afford a remedy is coextensive w/ its JD over the subject matter
  • where the ct. possesses JD to make a decree, it has the power to enforce its execution
  • since 28 USC section 2284 authorizes suit in fed. ct., it follows that this ct. has the power to enforce its judgments

 

Writ of Sequestration – (Shaw v. Wright)

  • it’s a remedy that allows the ct. to take possession of the real & personal property of a party who has been found in contempt in order to coerce compliance w/ a ct. order.
  • However, property that is sequestered is not available to be sold to satisfy a fine; the purpose is merely to compel compliance through deprivation of the property
  • It is effective against corporations & other entities that cannot be imprisoned

 

Execution of Decrees for Money  - execution of decrees for money is a

          remedy that authorizes the enforcement of money decrees by execution

Reeves v. Crownshield execution of decrees for money

·        D, a judgment debtor, was directed pursuant to a state statute to make installment payments out of his income…statute provided opportunity for the debtor to show inability to pay & took into consideration of D’s other financial obligations

  • A statute that authorizes a ct. to order a judgment debtor to pay a portion of his income in installments in satisfaction of the debt, refusal of such order being punishable by contempt, is not unconstitutional in that its effect is to allow imprisonment for debt
  • Imprisonment for failure to obey a ct. order which is made w/ consideration of the needs & obligations of the debtor does not violate the Due Process Clause
  • This is not imprisonment for debt, but imprisonment for refusal to obey a ct. order
  • In this case, D’s refusal to comply was arbitrary; no claim that he was unable to pay was made

 

Enforcement of Decrees in Rem – two types of statutes extend the power of

          Equity cts. to transfer property

  • under a vesting statute, the decree is self-executing in rem
  • under an appointive statute it is executed in rem
  • FRCP 70 (vesting title)– if real or personal property of the contemptuous party is located w/in the JD, the ct. may enter a judgment any party of title & vesting in others

Garfein v. McInnis absence of personal JD & specific performance of contract for sale of land w/in state

  • D & P, residents of different sales, entered contract for sale of land…D failed to perform & P sued for specific performance….summons & complaint were served upon D personally in his resident state, but not in state where land is located….D did not appear in the action….issue of whether JD had been obtained over D sent to ct. of appeals
  • held that in an action for specific performance, a ct. may grant a judgment which will operate directly on the property itself when personal JD has not been obtained over the vendor (seller)
  • Even w/o personal JD over the nonresident vendor of real estate, the ct. may order specific performance of the contract for sale
  • After the ct. has decreed specific performance, it can order the sheriff, on behalf of the absent D, to act directly on the property & transfer it to the vendee
  • Alternately the decree itself may be regarded as a valid conveyance of title
  • The basis of in rem JD is the presence of the subject property w/in the territorial JD of the forum state
  • If there is no personal JD, statues uniformly permit P to proceed quasi in rem (the local land is attached & the non-resident D given notice of the pending litigation)
  • Historically, equity decrees operated only in personam….in rem effect given to equity decrees is generally the result of statutory changes & code
  • The maxim that equity acts in  personam is still valid…..however, injunctions prohibiting certain acts by D do not make those acts done in violation of the decree invalid, even though D may be in contempt

 

(B)            DECREES AS TO FOREIGN PROPERTY

 

Conveyances of Foreign Land

Venue – only D may raise the issue of improper venue.

  • venue – proper or possible place fro the trial of a case, usually because the place has some connection w/ the events that have given rise to the case….the county or other territory over which a trial ct. has JD
  • a defect in venue is waived if not asserted in a timely manner
  • usually the proper ct. for transitory actions is the county in which any D resides
  • statutes often make other venue proper; e.g. tort cases may be brought in the county where the tort occurs; contract cases where the contract was entered or was to be performed
  • statutes regulating venue vary from state to state, but generally, the proper ct. fro trial of “transitory” actions is in the country in which any D resides
  • special statutes frequently make other venues proper; eg…personal injury case may be brought in the county where the accident occurred; contract actions may be brought in the county where the contract was entered into or was to be performed

 

General

(1) the ct. has no primary JD to directly affect title to land in another state.

  • such a decree is in rem & there is no JD over the resident

(2) ct may act in personam as to land outside the state

  • if the ct has personal JD over the D-seller of the land, equity may act “in personam” & order the D to execute a conveyance of the title to the out-of-state land

(a)   Result of Compliance – well & good; the fact that conveyance was executed under duress of the ct does make it invalid

(b)  Result of Noncompliance – if D-seller does not execute the conveyance & departs the JD, the ct’s decree is ineffective, because the decree cannot have no direct effect on title in another state & contempt proceedings will not be available to coerce compliance because D is beyond the ct’s reach

(3) similar rules where ct. orders act outside state

·        the same principles apply where P seeks an injunction directing D to perform or not perform some act outside the state

(a)   w/o personal JD – ct. cannot grant any relief

(b)  w/ personal JD – ct. can grant injunctive relief, but cannot enforce it by contempt if D refuses to comply & leaves the forum state

(4)  recognition of equity decrees by other states – this involves full faith &

          comity

(a)   decrees for payment of money – entitled to full faith & credit in every

other state

(b)  decrees affecting title to land in other state

(i)                there is no clear holding that they are entitled to full faith & credit

(ii)              as a practical matter decrees will be recognized & enforced by either full faith & credit or comity

(c)   decrees requiring acts in other state

·        equitable is discretionary; the local cts are entitled to retain the prerogative to exercise discretion as to equity decrees affecting local interests that were not represented in the ct where the decree was entered

(c)   injunctions against foreign suits

·        in the absence of fraud, oppression, or gross impropriety, a ct. will not enjoin a party from prosecution of an action in a foreign state

 

Penn v. Lord Baltimoreboundary dispute of foreign land

·        parties were in dispute over boundary lines between Penn. & Maryland…P’s allege a settlement was made & sought specific performance…D argued w/ theory that a ct could not order specific performance of an agreement regarding foreign land, nor could it enforce such a judgment if it were issued…

·        held – a ct can order specific performance of an agreement relating to land located in another state

·        a ct may issue a decree relating to the specific performance of an agreement regarding land in another state if the order is made in personam & no in rem

·        because the parties had made an agreement, which bound their consciences, the ct’s decree will act upon them in personam (provided the ct had obtained personal JD over the parties)

·        absent such an enforceable agreement, a ct generally may not issue orders affecting land outside its JD

·        the ct could enforce by contempt

·        by authority of a statute that ct can assert JD because this was a territory of the crown

 

Decrees Against Resident Owners of Foreign Property

·        generally a ct has JD to order a resident to convey foreign property in the following ways:

(a)   by specific performance of a contract

(b)  by performance of an express trust

(c)   by restitution of property obtained by fraud

 

Extraterritorial Effects of Decrees For Conveyance

Deschenes v. Tallmanorder of foreign ct to transfer title land in NY

·        P received title to the property in question from the liquidators of an insolvent Canadian corporation…P sold the property to D w/ convenant of seisin (ownership)…subsequently, P obtained a quiteclaim deed by the corporation confirming the original conveyance to P & issued directly to D…D defaulted on his payments & P brought this action to foreclose the purchase money mortgage…D counterclaimed for breach, claiming title does not pass under a deed by foreign liquidators

·        the judgment of a foreign ct alone is not sufficient to transfer to land w/in a state

·        the confirmation deed issued by the liquidators to D, however, constitutes an effective delivery of title & D is, therefore, liable for payments of P

·        judgment in favor of going to make them keep their promise

·        appears as if the ct was acting in rem, but was actually acting in personam

·        his deed transmits the title irrespective of pressure exerted on his will

·        the ct here notes the distinction between a judgment directed against the res itself & one directed personally toward the owner of the res.

·        although the person is compelled to convey title, this conveyance is nonetheless binding

 

  Burley v. Stevenson Gen. Scott rewarding surveyor

  • Gen. Scott agreed to convey certain lands in Ohio to Evans in payment for his services as a surveyor…Evans rendered his services…but Scott died before the lands were conveyed…Evans brought suit in Ky. against Scott’s heirs & representatives seeking specific performance of the agreement…
  • a ct. having power to compel the parties before it (in personam) to convey lands situated in another state may not make a decree which will operate to transfer title  to the land
  • although the Ohio ct could not compel the conveyance of the land pursuant to the Kentucky ct’s decree, it would recognize, according to the doctrine of full faith & credit, that state’s adjudication of the rights of the parties regarding the land in question
  • while the master’s deed to Evans was void, the decree of the Ky. ct was evidence that Evans had the right to have legal title conveyed to him, & it was this right which Ohio recognized under full faith & credit
  • (1)     both full faith & credit (US Const.) & comity (state law) lead to

sister states recognizing the decrees of another state

(2)              trust/beneficiary situation

McElreath v. McElreath divorce of OK residents where D fled to TX to avoid decree of OK ct concerning conveyance of land in TX

  • OK residents owned land in TX….divorce in OK….D ordered to convey Texas property to P…before decree could be enforced, D fled to TX to escape authority of OK ct….P brought suit to enforce decree
  • when the decree of one state (relating to land located in a 2nd state) does to violate the public policy of a sister state, that decree will be enforced in the sister state in accordance w/ the doctrine of comity
  • the public policy of TX was not violated by OK residents settling their dispute in OK
  • just because OK had a different method of transferring marital assets does not transgress public policy in TX
  • In rem decrees, which depended upon JD rules for their enforcement, must be distinguished from in personam decrees (which was the case here), which are dependant upon the public policy of the forum state
  • it is settled that the situs state is not required to full faith & credit to the judgment of a sister state which purports to act in rem & would directly affect the title to land in the situs

(1)              equitable distribution of marital assets does not necessarily mean 50/50

(2)              if I have a house before I was married & wife was not added to deed considered separate property & in TX wife cannot get to separate property; did not matter in OK

(3)              issue was about separate notions of equitable distribution of public property

(4)              if there is an action & the foreign ct issues a decree which goes to the direct conveyance the ct is out of its league

(5)              comity was used here rather  than full faith & credit because the state did not want the scope of public policy restricted by what the US Supreme Ct may hold if they got involved

  • in rem decrees, which depended upon JD rules for their enforcement, must be distinguished from in personam decrees, which are dependent upon the public policy of the forum state

Effect of Foreign Decrees For The Conveyance of Land

  • two separate inquiries are necessary in considering the effect of foreign decrees on the situs state:

(1)              will the cts of the situs state recognize the foreign state’s decree, &

(2)              if the situs state refuses to recognize the decree, does full faith & credit clause compel it to do so

Recognition of Foreign Money Decrees

Although the full faith & credit clause requires a final judgment in a civil action at law to be recognized it does not require a sister state to execute the judgment, however the sister state must:

(1)   treat the judgment as res judicate, and

(2) allow an action on the money JD

·        note: divorce actions may be brought wherever either party is domiciled, but property settlement can only be rendered by a ct w/ personal JD over both parties

Foreclosure & Partition

Eaton v. McCallmortgage foreclosure

  • ordinarily the mortgage should resort to the cts of the JD in which the land is situated
  • in extraordinarily circumstances, a ct can accomplish foreclosure upon land in a foreign JD by operation of an in personam decree against the mortgagor
  • 2 Considerations

(i)               property was outside of the state

(ii)            D was not present; therefore there was no in personam JD; cannot issue a decree in equity if the person is not there; this was a conservative ct

Wimer v. Wimer

  • no judgment or decree of a foreign ct can be directly enforced against real property in another JD
  • however, in cases of fraud, trust, or contract, if personal JD can be obtained over the parties, an in personam decree may be directed at the D to compel him to convey land
  • when in personam JD has not been obtained, no state may order the partition of lands in another state

 

(C)     INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN SUITS

Lord Portalington v. Soulby personal JD over the parties

  • P brought actions to dissolve an injunction restraining him from suing D in a ct in Ireland for payment of a bill of exchange, the basis of which was a gambling debt…according to Irish law, the basis of the bill constituted an illegal consideration….P argued the English ct could not enjoin the action brought to Ireland
  • when a ct has personal JD (in personam) over the parties it can enjoin  foreign proceedings
  • under such circumstances, the ct is exercising its authority over the person to restrain him from proceeding in a foreign ct
  • in this case, where the bill of exchange rests upon an illegal consideration, the injunction against proceedings to recover on the bill is particularly appropriate

Castanho v. Brown & Rootfactors considered

  • P, a citizen of Portugal, was very seriously injured while aboard a shop docked at Great Yarmouth…the ship was owned by a corporation in TX & doing business worldwide…P originally brought suit in England, but then brought suit in US because the prospect was better for more money…D sought to have proceedings continue in England.
  • A foreign ct can exercise its JD to restrain proceedings in another ct
  • because an injunction operates in personam, the foreign ct may exercise its JD to order parties over proceedings before any other ct
  • this JD should, however, be exercised w/ caution &, in order to justify the grant of the injunction, the D’s in this case would have to show:

Two Pronged Balancing Test

(1)          the English ct is one in which justice can be done at substantially less inconvience and expense, &

(2)          the injunctions must not deprive the P of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage available to him if he invoked the American JD.  The relative advantage to P & relative disadvantage to D must be weighed

  • in this case, we find that because of the much greater compensatory damages & the punitive damages available in the American ct, restraining him from proceeding in TX would, indeed, deprive P of a legitimate personal or judicial advantage
  • decision of the ct of appeals to discharge the injunction affirmed

British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd injunction against foreign litigation

  • D went bankrupt after P’s undercut D’s transatlantic fares…because it had no antitrust remedy in the UK, D brought an antitrust suit against P’s in the US…P’s then brought a suit in London seeking an injunction against the proceedings in the US
  • ct held a ct of one nation can enjoin a person w/in its JD from pursuing legal proceedings undertaken in another nation
  • equity is broad enough to permit a ct to grant an injunction against any party properly before the ct
  • this can even apply to prevent a person under the ct’s JD from pursuing a remedy in a foreign ct
  • however, the ct must exercise caution in granting such equitable relief, especially when the cause of action recognized in the foreign ct is not recognized in the English ct
  • the injunction sought by P’s could be granted if D’s suit in the US ct is an infringement of P’s right to be protected from unconscionable & unjust foreign suits
  • the equity must be such that the English ct must intervene to prevent injustice
  • in this case, P’s became parities to an international agreement regarding transatlantic fares
  • under the agreement, P’s became subject to the private law of the US as well as the UK
  • therefore, it was not inequitable for D to sue in the US
  • if the international agreement was defective, this is a diplomatic issue, not a judicial one

 

Vanneck v. Vanneck injunctions against foreign divorce & child custody actions

  • P & D resided in NY w/ children…D moved family to Connecticut…D filed suit in Conn. for divorce & custody…P brought suit in NY later….P sought to enjoin D from prosecuting the divorce in Conn., alleging D’s move was calculated in able to exploit state’s equitable distribution laws…
  • held a ct cannot enjoin a foreign divorce proceeding when the rights of the resident spouse are threatened if a petition concerning the custody of a child is also pending in the foreign ct
  • when a divorce proceeding includes child custody issue, the Uniform Child Custody JD Act is applicable
  • a ct will determine whether to enjoin divorce proceedings only after an inquiry into whether the custody phase of the litigation may proceed in the foreign ct
  • the UCCJA provides that even though the state has JD, it should not exercise that JD if, at the time of the filing of the petition, a custody proceeding is pending in another ct
  • the ct should communicate w. the foreign ct to determine which is the appropriate forum, the ct should consider whether the foreign ct has optimum access to relevant evidence & if the child has maximum contact w/ the state
  • in this case, there was evidence the children spent several months each year in the foreign state & the lower ct should have est. communication w/ the Conn. ct before enjoining the action there
  • the order of the appellate division finding the injunction inappropriate is affirmed
  • traditionally, an injunction against prosecution of a foreign divorce would be granted when the rights of a resident spouse were threatened; granting of relief involves consideration of such factors as the bona fides of domicile

Dobson v. Pearce

  • Olney obtained a judgment in a NY ct against D, a resident of Conn., based upon a claim that was fraudulent…Olney then brought suit in Conn. to enforce the judgment…D brought suit before same ct. & ct. declared the judgment fraudulent & enjoined Olney from prosecuting the action on it…Olney then made the assignment of the judgment to P, who took it w/ knowledge of the fraud used in procuring the judgment…P then tried to enforce in NY
  • held a foreign ct can order that a judgment may not be enforced by the state in which it was obtained
  • a ct of chancery has the power to grant relief against judgments obtained by fraud
  • the right of P in the judgment is personal right
  • the Conn. ct has personal JD over him & has the authority to declare the rights of the parties in the judgment
  • therefore, the determination of the Conn. ct of the matter of fraud is conclusive upon the parties & will be given full faith & credit by the NY ct.

James v. Grand Trunk Western RR Co counter injunction

  • P, a Michigan administrator, brought a wrongful death action in Ill. under the Michigan statute to recover against D, an Ill. railroad corporation, for death arising out of an accident that occurred in Michigan…D obtained an injunction against P in Michigan, enjoining her from proceeding w/ the Ill. action…P appeals an order denying her motion to restrain D from enforcing the injunction
  • held a ct, having prior JD over an action instituted by an nonresident, does not have to recognize another state’s injunction restraining the nonresident from proceeding w/ that action
  • also held a ct can issue a counter injunction restraining D from enforcing its injunction against P in the state of her residence
  • neither the doctrine of full faith & credit nor comity require compulsory recognition of injunctions restraining a non-resident form proceeding w/ an action in a ct having prior JD over an action
  • Michigan’s venue statute restricting the suits against railroads to the county in which P resides if the railroad lines traverse that county is not controlling
  • a state cannot create a transitory cause of action & at the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any ct having JD
  • that JD is determined by the law of the ct’s creation & cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a statute of another state, even extraterritorial operation of a stature of another state, even though that state created the right of action
  • it is well settled that a ct has the power & duty to complete and final justice between the parties, & may restrain proceedings in other cts for that purpose
  • in this case, even though the injunction is directed at the parties, its intended effect is to deprive the Ill. ct of its proper injunction
  • this ct is free to disregard such injunctions & to issue a counter injunction to restrain enforcement of the Michigan injunction
  • the counter injunction protects D from imprisonment for contempt from P enforcing the Michigan injunction order

 

(D)    STATE CT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FEDERAL CT PROCEEDINGS

Introduction – although 28 USC section 2283 generally prohibits federal cts from         

          enjoining state ct proceedings, there are no express prohibitions on state

          ct’s injunctions against federal ct proceedings

  • however, the Supreme Ct has held that state cts do not have the power to enjoined suits brought in federal cts

Donovan v. City of DallasTX Supreme Ct directed civil ct of appeals to enjoin P from prosecuting their case in federal ct

  • D planned to build an additional runway to its airport & sell municipal bonds to finance the construction….citizens filed a complaint to stop building…later, group brought suit in federal ct to stop…TX law prohibited issuing bonds while litigation challenging issue…
  • held a state ct cannot restrain federal ct proceedings in an in personam action & a judgment for contempt cannot be upheld when the restraining order, the violation of which is the basis of the contempt proceeding, is invalid
  • state cts are w/o authority to restrain federal ct proceedings even in in personam actions where the ct has JD over the subject matter (28 USC 1331 federal question & 28 USC 1332 diversity of citizenship) & the parties
  • P’s right to have issues decided by a federal ct has already attached & cannot be taken away by another ct
  • this is so even though the injunction is directed at the parties & not at the ct injunction is directed at the parties & not at the ct itself
  • a state ct may not punish a federal ct litigant for pursuing his right to seek relief in federal ct
  • in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem the state or federal ct having custody over the property has exclusive JD to proceed
  • where the judgment sought is in personam, both state & federal may proceed until judgment is reached in one of them, which may be set up as res judicata in the other
  • in this case it did not matter that the prohibition was addressed to the parties rather than to the federal ct itself
  • the ct of civil appeals assumes that P is guilty of disobeying a valid order
  • because it is unclear whether the TX ct would have punished P for contempt if it had known that the order violated was invalid, we leave consideration of this question to the TX ct on remand

 

(E)     FERERAL CT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STATE CT PROCEEDINGS

Introduction – 28 USC section 2283 prohibits federal ct injunctions to stay court

          proceedings except:

          a)      when expressly authorized by Congress

          b)      where necessarily in the aid of its JD

          c)       or to effectuate its judgments

d)      judicial exception – where a person about to be prosecuted in state ct can show that he will, if the proceeding in the state ct is not enjoined, suffer irreparable harm

 

ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – “Federal Ct injunction vs. state ct proceedings”

  • when a federal ct has JD over subject matter & personal, however, the exercise of JD would be inappropriate
  • Ways for a federal ct to intervene it must be:

1) irreparable injury, both great & immediate injury

          2) also includes harassment, bad faith, vexations

          3) a line by line facially invalid statute, blatantly obvious,

              unconst. on its face – but it then can be brought to a

              federal ct after adjudication in the state ct

Abstention Doctrines – Younger, Pullman, Burford, & Colorado Doctrine

 

Younger v. Harris – special circumstances not shown

  • P was indicated in state ct for violation of the Calf. Criminal Syndicalsim Act…he filed a complaint in federal ct seeking to restrain D, the district attorney of LA, from prosecuting him, alleging such prosecution, and the Act itself, were in violation of the 1st & 14th Amds. by inhibiting his rights of free speech & press…two interveners claimed the prosecution of P inhibited the expression of their views advocating the policies of the Progressive Labor Party…a 3rd intervener, a history teacher, alleged the prosecution of P made him uncertain as to whether he could teach about Communism doctrine…a three judge federal ct, convened pursuant to 28 USC section 2284, held that the state Cr. Syn. Act was void for vagueness & overbreadth in violation of the 1st & 14th Amd., and accordingly restrained D from prosecuting P….D appealed
  • held that in the absence of special circumstances, a federal ct could enjoin pending state ct proceedings that challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
  • Absence special circumstances, federal cts may not stay pending state ct criminal proceedings
  • in this case, P failed to show bad faith, harassment or other unusual circumstances that would justify equitable relief
  • the ct distinguished Dombrowshi v. Pfister, which involved substantial allegations of (i) harassment & vexations bad faith prosecution from which the state ct provided no relief (ii) great & irreparable harm, from the instant case where there was no evidence of that the prosecution of P would result in this, necessary to justify federal ct intervention in state ct criminal proceedings
  • neither is the existence of a “chilling effect” on 1st Amd. rights in & of itself sufficient to prohibit state action
  • a statute w/ an incidental effect of inhibiting free speech can be upheld if such effect is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct
  • the other parties had no standing to bring suit; there must be an actually case or controversy
  • if there is not adequate remedy at law irreparable harm may result
  • Our Federalism – represents a system where there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both the state & federal govt.; the federal govt. although it is always anxious to vindicate & protect federal rights & interests will not unduly interfere w/ the legitimate activities of the state; usually the interest must be irreparable which is both great & immediate
  • vagueness & overbreath are two of the biggest problems w/ state statute
  • Summary – abstention is appropriate in a state criminal proceedings, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, great & immediate irreparable harm; the possible unconstitutionality of a statute on its face is not sufficient

O’Shea v. Littletoninjury must be real & immediate

  • P & others brought a civil rights action on behalf of a class of citizens of Cairo, Ill. against several officials, including D & others, alleging racial discrimination in the adm. of the criminal justice system in violation of their const. rights…P alleged the discrimination treatment was intentionally designed to deter the class form engaging in boycotts & other activities…the complaint also alleged there was no adequate remedy at law & sought injunctive relief…
  • held a federal ct cannot grant an injunction against a state ct judge based upon allegations of racially discriminatory conduct
  • abstract injury is not enough…P must allege some actual or threatened direct injury…such injury must be “real & immediate” & “conjectural”
  • past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself evidence a present case or controversy for purposes of granting injunctive relief
  • even if this case did present a present case or controversy, P has failed to satisfy the threshold requirements for injunctive relief of immediate irreparable injury & lack of adequate remedy at law
  • this case fails to allege an actual case or controversy as required by Art. 3 of Const. that those who seek to invoke the power of federal cts must allege an actual case or controversy
  • Basic doctrine of equity is that cts of equity should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution:

(1)     when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law &

(2)     will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief

  • additional recognition of the need for a proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal & state cts counsel restraint against injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of state criminal laws in the absence of a showing of great & immediate irreparable injury
  • this case is an extension of Younger
  • Adequate Remedies at Law in this case:

(1)     right to a substitute judge

(2)     change in venue

(3)     review on direct appeal or on post conviction collateral

                   review

(3)            the opportunity to demonstrate the conduct of these

judicial officers is so prejudicial to the adm. of

justice that available disciplinary proceedings,

including the possibility of suspension or removal,

are warranted

(4)            federal habeas corpus relief

 

Statutes which the Supreme Ct has recognized constitute express exception to the policy of nonintervention in state proceedings enunciated by the anti-injunction state:

(a)              S1983

(b)              Bankruptcy Act

(c)               Interpleader Act

ect…….

Huffman v. Persue application of Younger to civil cases

  • D, the local sheriff, started a nuisance proceeding against a movie theater that displayed pornographic films…state ct determined the theater displayed obscene movies & could be closed…instead of appealing, P sued in federal ct…claiming D’s use of the nuisance statute deprived P of its const. rights…federal ct determined the statute was overbroad & enjoined the state ct’s judgment
  • held a federal ct can intervene in a state ct civil proceeding that involves a claim of a violation of federal const. rights
  • whenever federal cts are asked to interfere w/ state civil functions, they must exercise more restraint than in ordinary private equity cases
  • such interferences w/ state judicial proceedings prevents states from effectuating state policies & from providing a forum for vindication of const. objections
  • the aspect of the Younger principle that pertains to the threat to the federal system is applicable to civil proceedings just as much as it is criminal proceedings
  • the other aspect of Younger, which reflects the reluctance of equity cts to interfere w/ criminal prosecutions, does not generally apply to civil cases
  • in this case, however, D used a civil proceeding that was closely related to criminal statutes prohibiting the display of obscene material
  • P asserts that Younger properly applies to criminal cases in which the D may pursue habeas corpus after exhausting state ct remedies, but that because there are no similar protections for civil litigants
  • Younger should not apply
  • the availability of federal review was not a basis for the Younger rule
  • even though P could appeal from an ultimate state ct determination, the point of federalism
  • hence, the district ct should have applied Younger in determining whether to consider the merits of P’s case
  • P’s claims that because the state trial ct had entered it final judgment, there was no longer a pending state ct proceeding as required by Younger
  • But the Younger principle requires P to exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking federal relief, unless one of the arrow Younger exceptions applies, such as a case involving a statute that flagrantly & patently violates an express const. prohibition
  • one remand, the district ct must apply Younger rule
  • the ct noted, but did not rule on, the premise behind P’s argument….that every litigant who asserts a federal claim is entitled to have it decided on the merits by a federal, rather than a state, ct
  • the ct simply noted that even if this premise was correct, it would only apply at the completion of the state ct proceedings where the claim was first asserted
  • It is no longer true that any civil litigant may seek review in the Supreme Ct of federal claims properly asserted & rejected by state cts
  • Summary – abstention is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal JD has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at obtaining the closure of places exhibiting obscene films
  • Patently Invalid – implies the challenged statute is violative of express const. prohibitions in every clause, sentence, & paragraphs, & in whatever manner & against whomever an effort might be made to apply it

Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Dayton Christian Schools, Incmother should stay at home w/ children case

  • teacher fired for violating the dispute resolution agreement…teacher complained to Ohio Civil Rights Comm., which initiated administrative proceedings….P sought an injunction against D’s proceeding, claiming such proceedings violated P’s freedom of religion….
  • held the federal cts should abstain from granting injunctive relief against state adm. proceedings
  • P claims that D’s abstention argument was waived when D stipulated that the district ct had JD….however, abstention does not arise from lack of JD, but from principles of comity & federalism
  • normally, federal cts should abstain when asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state cts
  • the Younger principle is not limited to state ct proceedings….It applies as well to state adm. proceedings involving important state interests, provided the federal plaintiff such as P would have a full & fair opportunity to litigate the const. claims during the course of the proceedings
  • In this case, elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is an important state interest
  • in addition, P will receive an adequate opportunity to raise is constitutional claims…the mere fact of D’s exercise of JD over P does not alone require federal ct intervention, because even religious schools are subject to some state regulation…D may investigate to determine whether the teacher was in fact discharged for P’s religious reasons
  • the adm. agency did not determine substantive rights; only an investigative agency; state ct judicial review was permitted, but not necessarily authorized
  • Younger was applied to a civil action
  • Summary:

(1)              show great & immediate irreparable harm & we will step in

(2)              the state had a “serious dog in this fight”

 

Orleans Public Service, Inc v. Council of City of New Orleansno abstention from state legislative-type proceedings

  • P was a producer, wholesaler & retailer of electricity that participated in a “power pool” w/ three other similar companies…all four were owned by Middle South Utilities…..& all four agreed to finance the construction of two nuclear plants for a total cost of 1.2 billion…decreased demand led to suspension of one plant; completion of other was over 3 billion…the FERC determined the at P should pay 17% of the nuclear plant’s cost…the Council of City of New Orleans determined it would allow P to set rates sufficient to recover all but 135 million of the costs, on the ground that P was negligent in not diversifying its energy supply portfolio by selling some of the nuclear power…earlier decisions of the Supreme Ct had held that states had to comply w/ FERC’s allocations of wholesale power in setting intrastate retail rates…once it received D’s decree, P sought declaratory & injunctive relief in federal district ct.
  • held a federal district ct can not abstain from exercising JD over a utility’s petition for injunctive relief from the state’s ratemaking authority rate order in deference to the state review process
  • the district ct clearly had JD to hear P’s claim & generally federal cts may not abstain from exercise of its JD once conferred, because Congress, not the cts, defines the scope of federal JD
  • still federal cts may apply common law principles in determining whether  to grant certain types of relief
  • in Burford v. Sun Oil, the ct held that federal cts acting in equity could, but do not have to, abstain where timely & adequate state ct review is available so long as:

(1)              there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar, or

(2)              the exercise of federal review of the question in the case & in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to est. a coherent policy w/ respect to a matter of substantial public concern

·        the federal cts applied Burford here, apparently because the case involved state regulatory law & policy

·        but P’s claim that D is prohibited by federal law from refusing to provide reimbursement for FERC-allocated wholesale costs does not implicate the state got process or policies

·        abstention is not required merely because  resolution of a federal question may overturn a state policy

·        the inquiry in this case is limited to the four corners of D’s retail order to determine whether it is preempted by FERC’s allocation decree

·        Adjudication does not demand significant familiarity w/, and will not disrupt state resolution of, distinctively local regulatory facts or policies, so Burford was improperly applied

·        P claims that Younger should not apply because Younger does not require abstention when there is a substantial claim that the challenged state action is completely preempted by federal law, but the state has an interest in conducting its ratemaking proceedings, & P’s claim is the same one made in Younger, ie…that the allegedly unconstitutional state statue was not a proper subject of prosecution

·        P also claims that abstention was improper because the case falls w/in the Younger exception for irreparable injury, such as where the state action flagrantly violates const. prohibitions.  But D merely determined that D was negligent in failing to diversify its supply portfolio, & that P’s shareholders, not its rate payers, should pay for the negligence…nothing in this decision is foreclosed by federal law

·        P’s claim can succeed only if the state ct action is not the type of proceeding to which Younger applies.

·        Younger has never been applied to state judicial proceedings reviewing legislative or executive action; it has been applied only to criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, & civil proceedings in furtherance of state ct’s ability to perform their judicial functions

·        D’s proceedings is not judicial in nature, however, it was legislative, and even though state ct review was available, P did not have to exercise that options prior to its federal action

·        therefore, P’s federal suit did not interfere w/ ongoing state judicial proceedings, and abstention was improper

·        another basis for federal abstention arises when difficult & unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal const. question can be decided

·        state ct review was not an extension of the legislative process…if it had been Younger would have applied

Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman

·        abstention is appropriate in cases presenting a federal const. issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state ct determination of pertinent state law

·        the ct should abstain when there is a difficult & unsettled questions of state law which must be involved before a substantial federal const. question can be decided

·        if the state statute is facially invalid the federal ct can jump in

·        unlike Younger or Burford abstentions, Pullman abstention generally results in a stay rather than the dismissal of the federal action pending the outcome of state ct proceedings

·        federal ct should abstain from decisions when difficult & unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal const. question can be

Burford v. Sun Oil

  • in Burford v. Sun Oil, the ct held that federal cts acting in equity could, but do not have to, abstain where timely & adequate state ct review is available so long as:
  • Abstention is appropriate where:

(1)              there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar, or

(2)              the exercise of federal review of the question in the case & in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to est. a coherent policy w/ respect to a matter of substantial public concern

·        the state had est. its won elaborate review system for dealing w/ the geological complexities of oil & gas fields

·        federal interference would have had an impermissible disruptive effect on state policy for the management of those fields

Colorado River Water Conservation District v. US

·        concerned dispute over water rights in Colorado, which had divided state into water districts

·        US got brought case on behalf of Indians

·        District 7 Water District filed in Federal District ct

·        to be a matter of abstention must have 2 actions: 1 in federal ct & 1 in state ct

·        as soon as action filed in federal ct – there was an action filed in state court – federal ct dismissed on Doctrine of Abstention

·        ct of appeals reversed – District Ct should not have abstained, should have heard case – then appealed to Supreme Ct

·        issue was whether the McKaren Amd. had an effect on federal ct. JD (grants state cts rights, authorizing to hear these cases, even if federal ct. has an issue here)

·        held that McKaren Amd. did not override  fed. ct’s authority to hear these cases

·        ct’s reasoning – 1) looked at the plain language of Amd / nothing in McKaren expressly suggests state cts have original JD in these cases.  2) looks to history. 3) there is no presumption given here

·        had concurrent JD here

·        2nd Issue – whether federal ct should abstain where there is concurrent JD

·        ct states again abstention in the exception & not the rule

·        unless it falls under three areas of abstention, there is no abstention

How does ct go about determining need for abstention:

(1)              Look at Pullman  -  is there a Federal Const. issue

(2)              Look at Burford – difficult question of state law…federal review would be disruptive of state efforts to est. policy

(3)              Look at Younger – is it a criminal proceeding…extended to civil case if involved important state issue

The Colorado River Doctrine is a catch all – held Fed’s should abstain

·        federal ct may refuse to decide a case to avoid duplicative proceedings when the same issues are pending in state ct

·        While the general rule is that the tendency of an action in the state ct is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the federal ct having JD, the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation

·        the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial adm. are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriated for abstention

·        Factors used to make this determination:

(1)              inconvenience of the federal forum

(2)              desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation

(3)              order in which JD was obtained by the concurrent forums

(4)              whether the case is governed by state or federal law

(5)              the probable inadequacy of the state ct proceeding to protect the federal P’s rights

·        abstention from the exercise of federal JD is the exception not the rule

·        ct’s reasoning – 1) looked at the plain language of Amd / nothing in McKaren expressly suggest state cts have original JD in these cases.  2) looks to history. 3) there is no presumption given here

·        had concurrent JD here

·        2nd Issue – whether federal ct should abstain where there is concurrent JD

Rizzo v. Goode interference w/ operations of local agencies

·        a group of individuals representing members of a class of Philadelphia residents & a class of minority citizens alleged a pattern of unconst. mistreatment by police officers directed at the citizens of Philadelphia, in general, & at minority citizens, in particular…trials were held & ct ordered P to submit to it a program for improving the handling of complaints to police misconduct…

·        held that citizens do not have a mandatory federal equitable relief when a state agency fails to institute steps to reduce the incidence of unconst. police misconduct

·        important considerations of federalism weigh heavily against the intrusion of federal equity power upon the procedures of state agencies

·        the availability & scope of federal equitable relief against an agency of local govt. is very limited

·        such relief can be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances

·        the officers actually harming the citizens were not named in the complaint

·        here the district ct found that none of the petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of any rights secured under the Const.; judicial powers may exercised only on the basis of a const. violation; this case presented no occasion for the district ct to grant equitable relief against the petitioners

·        thus, the principles of federalism which play an important part in governing the relationship between federal cts & state govts., while having their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited to that situation

·        these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the got, but against the judicial branch of the state govt., but against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local govts. such as respondents here

Missouri v. Jenkinsstudents sue over segregation in public schools

·        Rule – fed. ct decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Const. or flow form a violation & they must take into account the interests of the state & local authorities in managing affairs consistent w/ Const.

·        held a federal district ct can not increase local property taxes to ensure funding for desegregation of public schools pursuant to the ct’s desegregation order

·        district ct. re-aligned KCMSD to make it a D, rather than a P – was a friendly advocate

·        originally 25 school districts were predominantly black, 43 were not

·        Vestiges – anything that gave the appearance of discrimination or segregation

·        federal district ct tried to reverse “white flight”

·        comity is not present when the district ct has been involved for 17 years

·        unitary school district – fair to all races

·        O’Conner – looked at part 2 of test; just because there is a predominate race in the school does not mean that there is a problem; there may be other demographical reasons for this

·        Thomas – just because the school is predominantly black does not mean inferiority; distinguish this from the Brown statement that said that “separate is inherently evil”

·        when ct exercises JD in equity:

(1)              it should exercise discretion soundly

(2)              it should not go above & beyond what is needed to remedy the problems

(3)              the injunction should reflect sound discretion

Segregation – (act or process of separation)

(1)   de jure – that intended by law

(2)   de facto – segregation in fact

                       

ABSTENTION DOCTRINES

 

Younger Abstention

(A)             Absent special circumstances, federal cts may not stay pending or ongoing state ct criminal proceedings, state nuisance proceedings antecedent to state criminal proceedings, & state adm. proceedings (Colorado River)

(B)              Civil – the state proceeding must involve important state interests which typically look to state law for their resolution (Ohio Civil Rights)

(C)             Exceptions:

1)     where there would be great & immediate irreparable harm (Dombrowski)

2)     where there are allegations of harassment & vexations or retaliatory prosecution from which the state provided no relief

3)     where there would not be an adequate opportunity in the state to raise & have timely decided the federal const. issues (Gibson)

4)     where the state law at issue is patently & flagrantly wrong in every particular (Huffman)

5)     where state judicial proceedings are reviewing legislative or executive action (NOPSI)

(D)             Unless one of the exceptions applies, P is required to exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking federal relief (Huffman)

Pullman Abstention

(A)             Abstention is appropriate in cases presenting a federal const. issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state ct determination or pertinent state law

(B)              Specifies:

(1)   there is substantial uncertainty as to the meaning of the state law (cases touches a sensitive area of state social policy0

(2)   there is a reasonable probability that the state ct clarification of the state law might make unnecessary the need for a federal const. ruling

(3)   while in state ct the P needs to advise the state ct of the existence of the federal issue, so the state ct can apply the state issue w/ the federal issue in mind

Burford Abstention

(A)             Abstention is appropriate when:

(1)   there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the results in the case then at bar, or

(2)   the exercise of federal review of the question in the case & in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to est. a coherent policy w/ respect to a matter of substantial public concern

(B)              Specifies:

(1)   usually the case involves complex issues of fact or state law

(2)   the issues usually are handled by special state judicial or adm. tribunals because of its transcendental effects & to assure uniformity w/ respect to important state interests

Colorado River

(A)             A federal ct may refuse to decide a case to avoid duplicate proceedings when the same issues are pending in state ct

(B)              This determination is bases on analysis of the following factors:

(1)   inconvenience of the federal forum

(2)   desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation

(3)   the order in which JD was obtained by the concurrent forums

(4)   whether the case is governed by state or federal law

(5)   the probable inadequacy of the state ct proceeding to protect federal P’s rights

 

All participants in the study group must always follow the BSL Honor Code.

php hit counter