EQUITY I
I.
INTRODUCTION
Definition of Equity:
1) fairness, impartiality, evenhanded dealing
2) The body of principles
constituting what is fair & right; natural rights
3) The recourse to principles of
justice to correct or supplement the law as
applied to particularcircumstances
4) The system of law or body of
principles originating out of the Ct. of Chancery &
superseding the common & statute law when the two
conflict
5) A right, interest, or remedy
recognizable by a ct. or equity
·
equity is a system of justice administered according to fairness
rather that strictly formulated rules.
·
it was developed for those cases where the law cts. would not
provide a remedy but where, in justice, there ought to be one
·
examples are where you have cause of action where the legal
remedy (usually money damages) will not suffice….but you still
deserve to have some type of remedy.
·
equity fills the gap….equitable remedies act upon
the person, forcing him either to do or refrain from doing a
particular act
·
equity – encompasses remedial relief
·
remedy - is the goal of litigation / a solution / provides
relief to injured
·
damages are a remedy
·
“ubi jus ibi remedium” – where there is a right, there is a
remedy
·
equity is designed to take care of a specific relief / cases
where the law is insufficient / includes injunctions
·
equity takes up where the law ends
·
remedies are substitutions for money for the damages
·
equity seeks to make the person / thing whole again
·
equity remedies are up to the discretion of the judge /
chancellor
·
just because a person has been harmed, does not mean there is an
equitable relief available
·
complete relief vs. substitutional relief
– equity seeks complete relief vs. remedies/damages seek
substitutional relief
·
to require specific performance, must show there
is no other remedy / there is no adequate remedy at law / there
is no substitution for lost item
·
the purpose of the Ct. of Equity –
fairness / seeking fairness
·
equity’s relationship to the law is that of supplement – it
completes, perfects the relief, so one gets a full relief
·
equity seeks individualized justice
·
“relative culpability” –
looks at how
the other party acted vs. ct. of law, which only needs to
satisfy the elements of law
·
ct. of law looks at the facts, where ct. of equity looks at
individual’s actions & culpability
(A)
Rights & Remedies
1) equity seeks
to provide individualized justice (common law treats everyone
same)
2) equity seeks
to provided a remedy when there is not adequate remedy at law
(B)
Relief Sought In Equity
(basis types)
1)
substitutional – damages (these substitute for the harm caused)
2) specific –
when the legal remedy is inadequate (injunctions)
3) other –
ejectment (recover possession of land) & replevin
(recover possession
of chattels)ttels)
(C )
Application of Equitable Relief
·
The distinction between legal & equitable
remedies retains vitality for two main reasons:
1) the right to a jury trial depends on the
remedy being legal
2) purely
equitable relief gives great discretion to the judge to evaluate
the equities of the parties
·
Cts. frequently refer to the following 3 sources of guidance:
1) natural law
& common law maxims
2) public
policy; and
3) civil law /
positive law
Riggs v. Palmer
–
use of equity to
prevent murderer from taking victim’s estate under will
·
D
murdered grandfather to ensure he would not change his will
leaving D large part of estate
·
the will statutes did not make a provision to prevent a murderer
from taking under the victim’s will – therefore, under statute,
D could still take under the will
·
Ct. said statutes must be construed to give the effect to the
legislative intent & sometimes an equitable construction may be
contrary to the letter of the law
·
ct. found the legislation’s could not have intended for murderer
to recover property under the will based on technicality of law
·
it is a common law principle that no one may profit by his own
fraud, take advantage of his own wrong, or acquire property by
his own crime
·
ct. ruled that a will procured by fraud may be set aside & a
person can no more obtain property through murder than he could
have by outright force or fraudulent inducement
·
Maxim – “one who comes into equity
must come with clean hands”
·
D’s conduct was criminal, so ct. refused to allow him to enjoy
the fruits of his crime
·
Here, there was no adequate remedy at law
Graf v. Hope
Building Corp.
–
equitable balancing of fault & hardship
·
interest payment wrongly computed & D failed to cover shortage
through inadvertent omission
·
Ct. may not dismiss a complaint if the cause of action arose
from D’s inadvertent omission
·
there is no defense to the suit
·
P
demonstrated a lack of generosity….but the ct’s job is not to
impose generosity
·
the mortgage was neither oppressive nor unconscionable….D’s
errors and omissions do not justify relief….not for ct. to exert
compassion….that is for the parties to do or not do
Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo
– it is
the federal ct’s discretion whether to order injunctive relief
·
Navy fired ordnance in water off Puerto Rico…w/o the proper
permit….but the testing was not causing any tangible damage to
environment
·
an injunction is an equitable remedy & should be granted only
when it is essential to protect property against otherwise
irremediable injuries
·
the basis for injunctive relief is irreparable injury &
inadequacy of legal remedies
·
even when irreparable injury is shown, an injunction is not a
matter of right…the ct. must evaluate the public interest & may
w/hold relief in the public interest
·
a
federal judge has JD to ensure compliance w/ a statute through
injunctive relief…but he has not duty to do so under any & all
circumstances
·
TQ
–
Ct. looked at the purpose of the act….injunctive relief is an
extraordinary remedy, not necessarily a guaranteed right….does
not exist as a matter of right….is at the discretion of the
judge, chancellor to decide
Nature of Equity
Equity questions usually involve three basic
issues:
(1)
Is
there a right to equitable relief?
·
equity will act only where there is an injury to a particular
type of right that cannot be remedied by an action at law
(2)
Is
equitable relief practicable?
·
the equitable remedy sought must be effective & enforceable
·
equity will not act where it does not have the power or the
means to carry out its orders, or where it would be difficult to
supervise performance
(3)
Are
there any equitable defenses that prevent the issuance of
equitable relief?
·
because equity is always interested in doing justice, it will
not act where it would be unfair to do so
The essential
concern of equity is to grant certain types of remedies.
Principles That Underlie the Granting of
Equitable Relief
Availability of Equitable Remedies:
Equity acts
only where there is no adequate remedy at law.
Remedies at law
may be inadequate because:
·
damages cannot make a P whole because the subject matter of the
litigation is unique
·
damages are speculative & uncertain
·
multiple & successive suits would have to be brought in order to
get relief at law
·
insolvency of the D makes the judgment at law uncorrectable
·
irreparable harm results from the D’s conduct which simply
cannot be fully compensated by a money judgment
Equity Acts Upon The Person:
·
personal JD is necessary since the usual equitable remedy is to
compel a person to do his duty in a specific case
·
today, equity cts. will exercise quasi in rem JD
Enforcement of Equity Decrees
Equity will not take JD where there are no
practical means to enforce its decree.
1)
Ct. must have power to force compliance
·
the only means for keeping a noncomplying D in line is w/ the
power of contempt
·
where contempt is insufficient to coerce compliance, equity cts.
are powerless to act
2)
Ct. must be able to determine whether there has
been proper compliance.
·
equity ct. must be able to determine to its own satisfaction
whether the task to be performed under the terms of the
equitable remedy are, in fact, properly done
Equity Applies Where A Property Right Is Present
·
general rule is that equity will grant relief only where a
property right is present
·
some cts. today will grant relief where no property right is
present – here they only require a “protectable interest”
Remedy In Equity Discretionary
·
the question of whether an equitable remedy should issue is ant
the sound discretion of the ct.
·
there is no absolute right to equitable relief
Right To Jury Trial
·
as a general rule, equitable claims are
determined by a judge; there is no right to a jury trial
·
if a party (1) joins several separate equitable claims & legal
claims that have certain issues in common or (2) states a single
claim & demands both legal & equitable remedies….she is entitled
to have the common facts
or the single claim
tried before a
jury
·
Example: P sues D for infringement of a trademark & seeks money
damages at law & injunctive relief in equity….both P & D are
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether D infringed the
trademark
Answering an Equity Questions:
·
just remember what the equity ct. is trying to do, and pose to
yourself the three questions above
·
keep in mind the “whys” & “wherefores” of equitable relief
II. HISTORY OF EQUITY
(A)
Origins of Equity
·
by end of 13th century, three separate cts. existed
in England; King’s Bench, Common Bench or Ct. of Common Pleas, &
the Exchequer
·
each ct. had its own sphere & by middle ages, P often had a
choice between the three cts.
·
the cts. developed the common law….so called because it was the
law common to all persons
·
to begin an action, P had to go to the chancery or an
administrative department of the exchequer to obtain a writ
·
although theses cts. were est., there was still a reserve
justice in the King
·
those who could not get relief elsewhere presented their
petitions to the King seeking a remedy
·
the Chancery began to handle these numerous requests, & this is
how the judicial powers of the chancellor developed
·
by the 14th century, two sides of the ct. of chancery
had developed – a common law & an equity side
·
if a case could not be adequately handled by a ct. of common
law, the chancellor issued a writ for the case to be heard by a
chancery ct.
·
remedies at common law were usually limited to damages; if a P
required other relief, he would have to seek it in a ct. of
chancery
·
the cts. of chancery had the power to enforce decisions because
their writs were in the name of the King & refusal to obey was
contempt of the King
(B)
Maxims of Equity
·
Equitable principles & notions can be expressed in the form of
maxims
·
There are two types: enabling & restrictive
·
Enabling Maxims – ex: “equity will not suffer a wrong to be w/o
a remedy” – pertains to the exercise of equitable JD
·
Restrictive Maxims – ex: “he who comes into equity must come w/
clean hands” constrains the ct. to deny equitable relief
(C )
Equity In The
United States
·
most states est. cts. w/ equity JD by the early 19th
century
·
Al. abolished ct. of equity in 1992
·
today, equity & law have been merged in most states in form
·
the substantive fights relating to the type of trial & remedy
remain distinct
(D)
Equity Acts in Personam
1)
Decree in Equity
Commands a D to Act in a Certain Way.
a)
equity tells a person to act in a certain way (affirmative
order) or
forbids her to act in a certain way
(prohibitive order)
b)
historically, this was in contrast to a judgment at law, which
did not
require a D to act or refrain from acting,
but rather, simply
declared the law as applied to that
particular case
2)
An In Personam Judgment Imposes
Personal Liability on the D.
a)
the equity ct. must therefore have personal JD over the D
b)
the D who fails to act as equity orders, has disobeyed a
personal
directive. Equity can enforce its decrees by
coercing appropriate
conduct, generally by the use of contempt
proceedings.
3)
Enforcement
Through Contempt Proceedings
J.R. v. M.P.
(1459)
–
enforcing ct. order through use of contempt powers
·
a
ct. of equity may not nullify an obligation in order to enforce
its order
·
the ct. may not cancel the obligation owed to P
·
the chancery’s only power is to enforce its decrees is contempt
·
there was no adequate remedy at
law; the ct. acted on the person, not the property
4)
Equitable
Defenses
·
the grounds for equitable relief against judgments usually
involve fraud, accident, mistake, surprise, or duress
·
Rule 8(e) of the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure – provide a party
may state all claims or defenses whether they are equitable or
legal
·
Some equitable defenses may bar equitable remedies w/o limiting
legal remedies:
-
the clean hands defense may preclude the remedy of specific
performance w/o affecting the availability of the remedy of
damages
-
caveat: the conduct that constitutes unclean hands may bar the P
from seeking relief at law under a defense by another name, or
she may be precluded from bringing another action at law by res
judicata rules
(E)
Merger of Law & Equity
1)
Federal Law – law &
equity were merged into one procedural system in Fed. Ctws in
1938
·
the distinction of the right to trial by jury at law has been
preserved
·
where the substantive law that has developed at law differs from
that in equity & a conflict occurs, law yields to equity
·
equitable relief is usually specific, whereas legal relief is
generally substitutional
·
equitable relief remains discretionary; legal relief is usually
a matter of course
2)
State Cts. – law &
equity have also merged in most state cts.
·
legal & equitable causes of actions may be joined in the same
proceeding, and legal & equitable defenses may be presented in
the same action
Strank v. Mercy
Hospital…
- equity
in US today
·
equity does have JD to enforce a contractual obligation where
there is an inadequate remedy at law
·
equity has JD not only for prevention of acts contrary to law
but also for the enforcement of obligations where damages either
cannot be calculated or are an inadequate remedy to redress the
wrong suffered
Mutual Life
Insurance v. Newton
–
recognition of equity decrees at law
·
D
used land to secure mortgage to secure bond…resulted in
foreclosure…
·
Ct. held a suit in equity on the foreclosure of a mortgage does
bar a subsequent suit at law on the underlying obligation
secured by the mortgage
·
the mortgage is security for the underlying debt; the action to
foreclose the mortgage is a final decree & bars subsequent
action on the original debt
·
the doctrine of res judicata provides that a cause of
action once finally determined on the merits, cannot be
litigated again in another proceeding, either before the same
ct. or another ct.
·
this is true whether the first adjudication is in a ct. of law
or ct. of equity
Joinder of equitable & legal claims
-
in a merged system of law & equity, all actions must be pleaded
& all defenses must be raised
-
if the ct. reaches the merits of the cased, subsequent suit is
barred
-
counterclaims: compulsory – arises out of the same t/o or common
nucleus of operative facts; permissive – does not arise out of
the same t/o or common nucleus of operative facts
(F)
Right to Trial by Jury
7th
Amd. – right to trial by jury exists in actions at law, but
not
in actions in
equity
What happens when both legal & equitable claims
arise in one case?
·
State – generally, where legal & equitable issues are joined,
either party may request a jury trial on the legal issues
·
Federal – the right to trial by jury has been extended to those
legal issues which are merely incidental to the equitable causes
of action
7th
Amd. – in suits at common law, where amount in controversy
exceeds $20, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved
·
two requirements for a jury trial are:
-
an issue triable by jury must be present
-
demand must be timely
·
demand must be in writing and timely
In Equity – triar of fact will always be a
judge/chancellor
Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, and Helpers… v. Terry
– two
pronged test to determine whether a suit involves legal rights
·
truckers transferred and lost seniority….sought jury trial in
order to seek monetary damages in form of backpay
·
ct. held an employee seeking backpay from his union for breach
of its duty of fair representation has a right to a jury trial
under the 7th Amd.
·
as in the 7th Amd., phrase “suits at common law”
refers to suits in which legal rights, including those created
by statute, are determined as opposed to suits in which only
equitable rights are recognized
·
the merger of law & equity has not eliminated this right
·
TQ
– the determination of whether a suit involves legal rights
requires examination of:
1) the nature
of the issues involved (compared w/ 18th century
equity actions in England) and
2) the remedy
sought (whether it is legal or equitable in nature)
·
in order for a party to be entitled to a trial by
jury – must show:
1) there was something in 18th century
law like your case (nature of
action)
-
was this the type of action a Chancellor would
have heard or is this an action heard by a ct. of law in 18th
century
2) nature of remedy sought – the general rule is
whenever a party is
seeking money damages, it is an action
at law / not universal
·
collective bargaining was illegal in the 18th, so P’s
action was unknown then
·
because P’s claim includes both equitable & legal issues, the 1st
test is not determinative
·
P’s seeks a remedy of compensatory damages
·
An action for monetary damages is generally considered legal
relief, but there are exceptions:
1)
restitutionary damages are considered equitable
2) a monetary
award that is incidental to injunctive relief may be equitable
3) Congress has
specified that backpay awarded against an employer under Title
VII is “equitable relief”
·
because the remedy P’s seek is legal in nature & the nature of
the issues involved are both legal & equitable, P’s are entitled
to a jury on all the issues in their suit.
III. POWERS OF THE EQUITY COURT
(A)
ENFORCEMENT OF EQUITY DECREES
The public
interest in orderly govt. requires that orders issued by cts.
having personal & subject matter JD be respected & complied
with.
·
while the principle is beyond dispute, the JD issues in specific
cases are often contested
Notice
– a
prerequisite to enforcement is notice of the order
·
minimum requirements – due process requires a person be notified
of the action before she can be held responsible for compliance
(1) such notice
must proceed from a source entitled to credit &
(2) it must
inform D clearly & plainly what is required under the order
The Cape May &
Schellinger’s Landing RR v. Johnson
– formal
service not required
·
city council receives telegram advising ct. order issued
directing them to refrain from passing a certain
ordinance….they disregarded & passed anyway
·
a
ct. order does not have to be formally served to be binding on
the party it is directed against.
·
a
ct. order that is in force must be obeyed; it cannot be
challenged by disobedience, even if it was improvidently granted
or irregularly obtained
·
D
did have actual knowledge of order, although not formally
served…
·
Actual notice is sufficient, so
long as the notice proceeds from a source entitled to credit &
informs D clearly & plainly from what act he must abstain
Lord Wellesley
v. Earl of Morington
–
persons bound by the decree
·
an agent of D disobeyed an injunction restraining D from cutting
timber
·
a ct. will interfere where a person
not specifically enjoined by the ct’s order willfully assists in
the act forbidden by the ct.
·
Batley, as agent of D, knew of D’s duty & should have taken care
not to commit any acts in violation of the injunction
Contempt Against
Nonparties
– the
only time a person not a party may be
punished is when she has helped to bring about
the thing forbidden,
which is that act of the person enjoined.
·
thus, the nonparty, to be
punishable for contempt, must have either abetted the D or been
legally identified w/ D; knowledge of the order is not
sufficient
·
representatives, agents, servants, etc. of party bound by decree
must also obey it
·
anyone acting in concert to get around the ct’s decree –
collusion
Rigas v.
Livingston
–
persons not acting in collusion not bound
·
P’s fruit stand torn down after order issued
·
parties not acting as agents or servants of the D
nor in collusion w/ them, but w/ knowledge of the existence of
the order, are not bound by an order enjoining the D’s
·
persons not connected in any way w/ the parties to the action
are not restrained by the order of the ct.
·
the order was directed at certain
city officials, and as general rule, such an order cannot be
directed at the “whole world”
·
the activity is not necessarily
prohibited, but that activity when engaged in by that party or
parties
United
Pharmacal Corp. v. US
·
P
had preliminary injunction to prevent release of drug into
interstate commerce – D sent it anyway
·
a party who is not in active
concert or participation w/ the party enjoined cannot be held in
contempt for violation of that JD
·
a party who is not ID w. the party enjoined as
its agent, servant, subsidiary, tool, or alter ego, cannot be
said to have acted in concert or in participation w/ the
enjoined party in violation of the injunction
US v. Hall
–
exception to the common law rule
·
ct. entered judgement requiring local school board to complete
desegregation of schools….lead to racial unrest…ct. then ordered
students from engaging in violent behavior…limited access to
school parents, students, etc….D, not a party to original case,
violated order & was arrested
·
a person who is neither a party nor
bears any legal relationship to a party can be punished for
criminal contempt for violating a ct. order designed to protect
a judgment on the original case
·
the general common law rule that a ct. of equity has no power to
punish for contempt a nonparty who violates an injunction solely
in pursuit of his own interests arose
in cases in which the 3rd party’s activities could
not disturb the adjudication of rights & obligations between the
original parties
·
here, D’s activities threatened the parties to the original Mims
case, the P’s right to attend an integrated school
·
a
ct. has power to render a binding judgment, and may protect this
power by punishing for contempt
·
this principle is the basis for in
rem injunctions, which are binding on all persons who come into
contact w/ property that is the subject of a judicial decree
·
school desegregation orders, like in rem orders, are
particularly vulnerable to disruption by nonparties, & cts must
be able to protect their judgments
Collateral Bar
Rule
·
once a ct. determines that it lacks JD, rulings
or orders made by it other than a dismissal or transfer are void
·
unless the claim is patently frivolous, every ct. has the JD to
determine its own JD
·
in other words, the ct. can properly exercise judicial power
long enough to rule on whether it has JD
·
one who defies the ct. & willfully refuses obedience does so at
his peril
·
Effect of Disobedience –
willful
disobedience of a ct. order w/o any attempt to challenge the
order through appropriate procedures is punishable by criminal
contempt even if the order is later set aside on appeal or the
basis of the action becomes moot
·
However,
if the order is
shown to have been erroneously issued, the judgment of civil
contempt can be set aside
(1) sentences for criminal contempt are for the
purpose of vindicating the
authority of the ct.
(2) civil contempt is ordered to either coerce
the D into compliance or
compensate the P for losses sustained
US v. United
Mine Workers of America
–
disregard of appealable order
·
D’s striked even though the P, owner of the mines, obtained a
temporary restraining order against strikes
·
a
party may not disregard an appealable ct. order issued pursuant
to ancillary (supplementary) federal JD
·
when there are elements of federal JD & ct. order is issued
supplementary to the main suit, the order must be obeyed under
penalty of contempt even if the order can be appealed
·
D
acted on its own peril when it disobeyed order
·
the ct. had JD to issue a temp. restraining order while it tried
to determine its won powers under the NorrisLaGuardia Act
·
even if the ct’s order was
erroneous, it must be obeyed until it is reversed by orderly &
proper proceedings
·
if later set aside, the violation
is still punishable by criminal contempt….but conviction for
civil contempt would be reversed
·
this decision illustrates the basic function of the contempt
power – the application of judicially ordered force to coerce
compliance w/ ct. orders
·
one limitation on the ct’s contempt
power is the requirement the ct. have JD.…this means that the
ct. must at least appear to have both personal & subject matter
JD before its contempt citations will be upheld
·
when ct. issues an injunction, the
ct. must be specific as to the parities, the activities
restrained or prohibited or proscribed for performance
·
personal JD is waivable, subject matter JD is not
Walker v. City
of Birmingham
–
disregard of unconstitutional ordinances
·
civil rights protestors conduct protest in violation of an
unconstitutional injunction…held in contempt
·
ct. does not have to consider the constitutionality of the
unchallenged underlying ordinance which led to the criminal
contempt citation
·
there is no constitutional freedom to ignore est. procedures of
law, and D’s were therefore properly held in contempt
·
the ordinance the temp. restraining order prohibiting D was
later found unconstitutional…however…
the rationale of
this case, that the proper procedure to subvert an injunction is
to subject it to review rather than disobey it, is still valid
Void & Invalid Orders
(1)
valid orders – an
erroneous but jurisdictionally invalid order must be obeyed
until
reversed or set aside on appeal; punishable by criminal, but not
civil
contempt
(2)
void orders –
injunctions entered by cts. lacking subject matter JD are void &
are
not enforceable by civil or criminal contempt; exception is if
the claim
of
subject matter JD is not frivolous or insubstantial
(3)
void orders involving the 1st
Amd. – injunctions violating the 1st Amd. are
void
but
violation of those orders subject the violator to criminal
contempt
unless the order is transparently invalid
Civil & Criminal
Contempt
– willful disobedience of an order of a ct. of equity
constitutes contempt of ct., but punishment depends on the
circum-
stances
(1)
criminal – proceedings
must comply w/ the requirements for criminal proceedings
generally, such as burden of proof, right to counsel, jury
trial, etc.
·
the proceedings are separate from the underlying proceedings;
generally used to punish the contemnor for disobedience or
vindicate its authority
(2)
civil – normally an
adjunct to the underlying case;
·
generally used to coerce compliance or to assist a complaint
International
Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell
- mining companies filed
suit, alleging unfair labor practices
- before cases came to
ct., 2 parties settled
- st. of Virginia & 2
counties still get $54 million even though ct. dismissed
case
-
issue was whether the fines were civil or
criminal
- there are two major
types of contempt; criminal & civil
- the distinction between
the two turns on the character & purpose of the sanction
involved
- if contempt sanction is
remedial & for the benefit of the complaint – civil
- if it is punitive & to
vindicate the authority of the ct. – criminal
- if civil – still
responsible for paying the fines
- if criminal – have to
have a trial w/ jury & decide if still liable for money & is
entitled to due process
Both
contempts may involve fines & imprisonment
-
in civil contempt imprisonment, an attempt is
made to coerce the party to perform…if he acts, he is
released….carries the “keys of his prison in his own pocket”
-
in criminal contempt imprisonment, a fixed
sentence is imposed for an act of disobedience…it is not
coercive
- a contempt fine is
considered civil & remedial if it either coerces the D into
compliance or compensates
- a flat unconditional
fine is criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent
opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance
Civil vs.
Criminal
Civil – no jury
required….preponderance of the evidence sometimes clear &
Convincing
proof…direct…fine is small, less severe
Criminal – jury
trial….reasonable doubt…right to counsel….cross examination
What must be shown in order to show the sanctions
are Civil:
1)
coerces
compliance or
2)
it is
compensates victim / wronged party for harm suffered
If it is prohibitive – tends
to be criminal
In re Yengo
– direct
& indirect contempt
- attorney goes on
vacation and fails to appear in court
- ct. held an attorney’s
unexcused absence from trial a direct contempt for
procedural purposes
- where the
explanation is clearly inadequate, the need to maintain the
authority of the ct. should predominate & the offense should
be treated as a direct contempt
- where there is a good
faith excuse, the offense will be treated as indirect
contempt
-
Summery Contempt Test:
(a)
act
or omission must occur in the presence of the ct. so that no
further evidence need be adduced for the judge to certify to the
observation of the contumacious behavior and
(b)
the
act must impact adversely on the authority of the ct.
Pounders v. Watson
·
summary contempt convictions of counsel have been
held where the following characteristics were present:
(a)
it
took place in the immediate presence of the trial judge
(b)
it
consisted of breaches of decorum & disobedience in the presence
of the jury upon trial
(c)
the
conduct was professional in that it was of lawyers
(d)
upon a course of conduct lont-continued in the face of warnings
that it was regarded by the ct. as contemptuous
- one contumacious act
could be enough
- here the trial ct.
expressly found that respondent’s questions in open ct. had
permanently prejudiced the jury in favor to her client &
that the prejudice cannot be overcome
- the trail ct’s findings
that respondent’s comments had prejudiced the jury, together
w/ its assessment of the flagrance of the respondent’s
defiance support the findings of the need for summary
contempt
In re Little
– criminal contempt
- D was forced to defend
himself in district ct. and made closing remarks suggesting
bias on part of the ct….judge for D in contempt for remarks
- a trial ct. may not
convict a party of contempt for merely accusing the ct. of
bias
- merely accusing the ct.
of bias in summation does not constitute criminal contempt.
- There is no evidence to
show that D's comments actually disrupted the ct’s
proceedings
- In order for such
statements to be contemptuous they must constitute an
imminent threat to the adm. of justice
- D’s behavior posed no
such threat & his conviction must, therefore, be reversed
Writ of Assistance
– is a remedy for enforcement
of ct. decrees that applies only to real property. It is
a mandatory injunction that dispossesses the occupant of real
property & gives it to the person entitled to possession.
Hamilton v. Nakai
- dispute over rights to
a Indian reservation….P’s sought a writ of assistance in
district ct. to enforce their rights of joint tenancy
- ct. was found to have
proper JD over this matter
- the power of the ct. to
afford a remedy is coextensive w/ its JD over the subject
matter
- where the ct.
possesses JD to make a decree, it has the power to enforce
its execution
- since 28 USC section
2284 authorizes suit in fed. ct., it follows that this ct.
has the power to enforce its judgments
Writ of Sequestration
– (Shaw v. Wright)
-
it’s a remedy that allows the ct. to take
possession of the real & personal property of a party who
has been found in contempt in order to coerce compliance w/
a ct. order.
- However, property that
is sequestered is not available to be sold to satisfy a
fine; the purpose is merely to compel compliance through
deprivation of the property
- It is effective against
corporations & other entities that cannot be imprisoned
Execution of
Decrees for Money
-
execution of
decrees for money is a
remedy that authorizes the enforcement of money decrees by
execution
Reeves v. Crownshield
–
execution of decrees for money
·
D, a judgment debtor, was
directed pursuant to a state statute to make installment
payments out of his income…statute provided opportunity for the
debtor to show inability to pay & took into consideration of D’s
other financial obligations
- A statute that
authorizes a ct. to order a judgment debtor to pay a portion
of his income in installments in satisfaction of the debt,
refusal of such order being punishable by contempt, is not
unconstitutional in that its effect is to allow imprisonment
for debt
- Imprisonment for
failure to obey a ct. order which is made w/ consideration
of the needs & obligations of the debtor does not violate
the Due Process Clause
- This is not
imprisonment for debt, but imprisonment for refusal to obey
a ct. order
- In this case, D’s
refusal to comply was arbitrary; no claim that he was unable
to pay was made
Enforcement of Decrees in Rem
– two types of statutes extend the
power of
Equity cts. to
transfer property
- under a vesting
statute, the decree is self-executing in rem
- under an appointive
statute it is executed in rem
- FRCP 70 (vesting
title)– if real or personal property of the contemptuous
party is located w/in the JD, the ct. may enter a judgment
any party of title & vesting in others
Garfein v. McInnis
–
absence of personal JD & specific performance of contract for
sale of land w/in state
- D & P, residents of
different sales, entered contract for sale of land…D failed
to perform & P sued for specific performance….summons &
complaint were served upon D personally in his resident
state, but not in state where land is located….D did not
appear in the action….issue of whether JD had been obtained
over D sent to ct. of appeals
- held that in an
action for specific performance, a ct. may grant a judgment
which will operate directly on the property itself when
personal JD has not been obtained over the vendor (seller)
- Even w/o personal JD
over the nonresident vendor of real estate, the ct. may
order specific performance of the contract for sale
- After the ct. has
decreed specific performance, it can order the sheriff, on
behalf of the absent D, to act directly on the property &
transfer it to the vendee
- Alternately the decree
itself may be regarded as a valid conveyance of title
- The basis of in rem
JD is the presence of the subject property w/in the
territorial JD of the forum state
- If there is no personal
JD, statues uniformly permit P to proceed quasi in rem
(the local land is attached & the non-resident D given
notice of the pending litigation)
- Historically, equity
decrees operated only in personam….in rem effect given to
equity decrees is generally the result of statutory changes
& code
- The maxim that equity
acts in personam is still valid…..however, injunctions
prohibiting certain acts by D do not make those acts done in
violation of the decree invalid, even though D may be in
contempt
(B)
DECREES AS TO FOREIGN PROPERTY
Conveyances
of Foreign Land
Venue – only D may raise the issue of improper
venue.
- venue – proper or
possible place fro the trial of a case, usually because the
place has some connection w/ the events that have given rise
to the case….the county or other territory over which a
trial ct. has JD
- a defect in venue is
waived if not asserted in a timely manner
- usually the proper ct.
for transitory actions is the county in which any D resides
- statutes often make
other venue proper; e.g. tort cases may be brought in the
county where the tort occurs; contract cases where the
contract was entered or was to be performed
- statutes regulating
venue vary from state to state, but generally, the proper
ct. fro trial of “transitory” actions is in the country in
which any D resides
- special statutes
frequently make other venues proper; eg…personal injury case
may be brought in the county where the accident occurred;
contract actions may be brought in the county where the
contract was entered into or was to be performed
General
(1) the ct. has no
primary JD to directly affect title to land in another state.
- such a decree is in rem
& there is no JD over the resident
(2) ct may act in
personam as to land outside the state
-
if the ct has personal JD over the D-seller
of the land, equity may act “in personam” & order the D to
execute a conveyance of the title to the out-of-state land
(a)
Result of Compliance
– well & good; the fact that conveyance was executed under
duress of the ct does make it invalid
(b)
Result of Noncompliance
– if D-seller does not execute the conveyance & departs the JD,
the ct’s decree is ineffective, because the decree cannot have
no direct effect on title in another state & contempt
proceedings will not be available to coerce compliance because D
is beyond the ct’s reach
(3)
similar rules
where ct. orders act outside state
·
the same principles apply where P
seeks an injunction directing D to perform or not perform some
act outside the state
(a)
w/o personal JD – ct. cannot grant
any relief
(b)
w/
personal JD – ct. can grant
injunctive relief, but cannot enforce it by contempt if D
refuses to comply & leaves the forum state
(4)
recognition of equity decrees
by other states – this involves full faith &
comity
(a)
decrees for payment of money
– entitled to full faith & credit in every
other state
(b)
decrees affecting title to land in other state
(i)
there is no clear holding that they are entitled to full faith &
credit
(ii)
as
a practical matter decrees will be recognized & enforced by
either full faith & credit or comity
(c)
decrees requiring acts in other state
–
·
equitable is discretionary; the
local cts are entitled to retain the prerogative to exercise
discretion as to equity decrees affecting local interests that
were not represented in the ct where the decree was entered
(c)
injunctions against foreign suits
–
·
in the absence of fraud,
oppression, or gross impropriety, a ct. will not enjoin a party
from prosecution of an action in a foreign state
Penn v. Lord Baltimore
– boundary
dispute of foreign land
·
parties were in dispute over
boundary lines between Penn. & Maryland…P’s allege a settlement
was made & sought specific performance…D argued w/ theory that a
ct could not order specific performance of an agreement
regarding foreign land, nor could it enforce such a judgment if
it were issued…
·
held – a ct can order specific
performance of an agreement relating to land located in another
state
·
a ct may issue a decree relating
to the specific performance of an agreement regarding land in
another state if the order is made in personam & no in rem
·
because the parties had made an
agreement, which bound their consciences, the ct’s decree will
act upon them in personam (provided the ct had obtained personal
JD over the parties)
·
absent such an enforceable
agreement, a ct generally may not issue orders affecting land
outside its JD
·
the ct could enforce by contempt
·
by authority of a statute that ct
can assert JD because this was a territory of the crown
Decrees Against Resident Owners of Foreign
Property
·
generally a ct has JD to order a resident to convey foreign
property in the following ways:
(a)
by specific
performance of a contract
(b)
by performance
of an express trust
(c)
by restitution
of property obtained by fraud
Extraterritorial Effects of Decrees For
Conveyance
Deschenes v. Tallman
– order of
foreign ct to transfer title land in NY
·
P received title to the property in
question from the liquidators of an insolvent Canadian
corporation…P sold the property to D w/ convenant of seisin
(ownership)…subsequently, P obtained a quiteclaim deed by the
corporation confirming the original conveyance to P & issued
directly to D…D defaulted on his payments & P brought this
action to foreclose the purchase money mortgage…D counterclaimed
for breach, claiming title does not pass under a deed by foreign
liquidators
·
the judgment of a foreign ct alone is not
sufficient to transfer to land w/in a state
·
the confirmation deed issued by the
liquidators to D, however, constitutes an effective delivery of
title & D is, therefore, liable for payments of P
·
judgment in favor of going to make
them keep their promise
·
appears as if the ct was acting
in rem, but was actually acting in personam
·
his deed transmits the title
irrespective of pressure exerted on his will
·
the ct here notes the distinction
between a judgment directed against the res itself & one
directed personally toward the owner of the res.
·
although the person is compelled to
convey title, this conveyance is nonetheless binding
Burley
v. Stevenson –
Gen. Scott rewarding surveyor
- Gen. Scott agreed to
convey certain lands in Ohio to Evans in payment for his
services as a surveyor…Evans rendered his services…but Scott
died before the lands were conveyed…Evans brought suit in
Ky. against Scott’s heirs & representatives seeking specific
performance of the agreement…
- a ct. having power
to compel the parties before it (in personam) to convey
lands situated in another state may not make a decree which
will operate to transfer title to the land
- although the Ohio ct
could not compel the conveyance of the land pursuant to the
Kentucky ct’s decree, it would recognize, according to the
doctrine of full faith & credit, that state’s adjudication
of the rights of the parties regarding the land in question
- while the master’s deed
to Evans was void, the decree of
the Ky. ct was evidence that Evans had the right to have
legal title conveyed to him, & it was this right which Ohio
recognized under full faith & credit
- (1) both full faith
& credit (US Const.) & comity (state law) lead to
sister states recognizing the decrees of another state
(2)
trust/beneficiary situation
McElreath v. McElreath
–
divorce of OK
residents where D fled to TX to avoid decree of OK ct concerning
conveyance of land in TX
- OK residents owned land
in TX….divorce in OK….D ordered to convey Texas property to
P…before decree could be enforced, D fled to TX to escape
authority of OK ct….P brought suit to enforce decree
- when the decree of
one state (relating to land located in a 2nd
state) does to violate the public policy of a sister state,
that decree will be enforced in the sister state in
accordance w/ the doctrine of comity
- the public policy of TX
was not violated by OK residents settling their dispute in
OK
- just because OK had a
different method of transferring marital assets does not
transgress public policy in TX
- In rem decrees, which
depended upon JD rules for their enforcement, must be
distinguished from in personam decrees (which was the case
here), which are dependant upon the public policy of the
forum state
- it is settled that
the situs state is not required to full faith & credit to
the judgment of a sister state which purports to act in rem
& would directly affect the title to land in the situs
(1)
equitable distribution of marital assets does not necessarily
mean 50/50
(2)
if
I have a house before I was married & wife was not added to deed
considered separate property & in TX wife cannot get to separate
property; did not matter in OK
(3)
issue was about separate notions of equitable distribution of
public property
(4)
if there is an action & the
foreign ct issues a decree which goes to the direct conveyance
the ct is out of its league
(5)
comity was used here rather than full faith & credit because
the state did not want the scope of public policy restricted by
what the US Supreme Ct may hold if they got involved
-
in rem decrees, which depended upon JD rules
for their enforcement, must be distinguished from in
personam decrees, which are dependent upon the public policy
of the forum state
Effect of Foreign Decrees For The Conveyance of
Land
- two separate inquiries
are necessary in considering the effect of foreign decrees
on the situs state:
(1)
will the cts of the situs state recognize the foreign state’s
decree, &
(2)
if
the situs state refuses to recognize the decree, does full faith
& credit clause compel it to do so
Recognition of Foreign Money Decrees
Although the full faith &
credit clause requires a final judgment in a civil action at law
to be recognized it does not require a sister state to execute
the judgment, however the sister state must:
(1)
treat the judgment as res judicate, and
(2) allow an action on the money JD
·
note: divorce actions may be
brought wherever either party is domiciled, but property
settlement can only be rendered by a ct w/ personal JD over both
parties
Foreclosure & Partition
Eaton v. McCall
– mortgage
foreclosure
- ordinarily the
mortgage should resort to the cts of the JD in which the
land is situated
- in extraordinarily
circumstances, a ct can accomplish foreclosure upon land in
a foreign JD by operation of an in personam decree against
the mortgagor
- 2 Considerations
(i)
property was outside of the state
(ii)
D
was not present; therefore there was no in personam JD; cannot
issue a decree in equity if the person is not there; this was a
conservative ct
Wimer v. Wimer
-
no judgment or decree of a foreign ct can be
directly enforced against real property in another JD
- however, in cases of
fraud, trust, or contract, if personal JD can be obtained
over the parties, an in personam decree may be directed at
the D to compel him to convey land
- when in personam JD
has not been obtained, no state may order the partition of
lands in another state
(C) INJUNCTIONS
AGAINST FOREIGN SUITS
Lord Portalington v.
Soulby –
personal JD over
the parties
- P brought actions to
dissolve an injunction restraining him from suing D in a ct
in Ireland for payment of a bill of exchange, the basis of
which was a gambling debt…according to Irish law, the basis
of the bill constituted an illegal consideration….P argued
the English ct could not enjoin the action brought to
Ireland
-
when a ct has personal JD (in personam) over
the parties it can enjoin foreign proceedings
- under such
circumstances, the ct is exercising its authority over the
person to restrain him from proceeding in a foreign ct
- in this case, where the
bill of exchange rests upon an illegal consideration, the
injunction against proceedings to recover on the bill is
particularly appropriate
Castanho v. Brown & Root
– factors
considered
- P, a citizen of
Portugal, was very seriously injured while aboard a shop
docked at Great Yarmouth…the ship was owned by a corporation
in TX & doing business worldwide…P originally brought suit
in England, but then brought suit in US because the prospect
was better for more money…D sought to have proceedings
continue in England.
- A foreign ct can
exercise its JD to restrain proceedings in another ct
- because an injunction
operates in personam, the foreign ct may exercise its JD to
order parties over proceedings before any other ct
-
this JD should, however, be exercised w/
caution &, in order to justify the grant of the injunction,
the D’s in this case would have to show:
Two Pronged
Balancing Test
(1)
the English ct is one in which justice can be done at
substantially less inconvience and expense, &
(2)
the injunctions must not deprive the P of a legitimate personal
or juridical advantage available to him if he invoked the
American JD. The relative advantage to P & relative
disadvantage to D must be weighed
- in this case, we find
that because of the much greater compensatory damages & the
punitive damages available in the American ct, restraining
him from proceeding in TX would, indeed, deprive P of a
legitimate personal or judicial advantage
- decision of the ct of
appeals to discharge the injunction affirmed
British Airways Bd. v.
Laker Airways, Ltd –
injunction against
foreign litigation
- D went bankrupt after
P’s undercut D’s transatlantic fares…because it had no
antitrust remedy in the UK, D brought an antitrust suit
against P’s in the US…P’s then brought a suit in London
seeking an injunction against the proceedings in the US
- ct held a ct of one
nation can enjoin a person w/in its JD from pursuing legal
proceedings undertaken in another nation
- equity is broad enough
to permit a ct to grant an injunction against any party
properly before the ct
- this can even apply to
prevent a person under the ct’s JD from pursuing a remedy in
a foreign ct
- however, the ct must
exercise caution in granting such equitable relief,
especially when the cause of action recognized in the
foreign ct is not recognized in the English ct
- the injunction sought
by P’s could be granted if D’s suit in the US ct is an
infringement of P’s right to be protected from
unconscionable & unjust foreign suits
- the equity must be such
that the English ct must intervene to prevent injustice
- in this case, P’s
became parities to an international agreement regarding
transatlantic fares
- under the agreement,
P’s became subject to the private law of the US as well as
the UK
- therefore, it was not
inequitable for D to sue in the US
- if the international
agreement was defective, this is a diplomatic issue, not a
judicial one
Vanneck v. Vanneck
–
injunctions against foreign divorce & child custody actions
- P & D resided in NY w/
children…D moved family to Connecticut…D filed suit in Conn.
for divorce & custody…P brought suit in NY later….P sought
to enjoin D from prosecuting the divorce in Conn., alleging
D’s move was calculated in able to exploit state’s equitable
distribution laws…
-
held a ct cannot enjoin a foreign divorce
proceeding when the rights of the resident spouse are
threatened if a petition concerning the custody of a child
is also pending in the foreign ct
- when a divorce
proceeding includes child custody issue, the Uniform Child
Custody JD Act is applicable
- a ct will determine
whether to enjoin divorce proceedings only after an inquiry
into whether the custody phase of the litigation may proceed
in the foreign ct
- the UCCJA provides that
even though the state has JD, it should not exercise that JD
if, at the time of the filing of the petition, a custody
proceeding is pending in another ct
- the ct should
communicate w. the foreign ct to determine which is the
appropriate forum, the ct should consider whether the
foreign ct has optimum access to relevant evidence & if the
child has maximum contact w/ the state
- in this case, there was
evidence the children spent several months each year in the
foreign state & the lower ct should have est. communication
w/ the Conn. ct before enjoining the action there
- the order of the
appellate division finding the injunction inappropriate is
affirmed
- traditionally, an
injunction against prosecution of a foreign divorce would be
granted when the rights of a resident spouse were
threatened; granting of relief
involves consideration of such factors as the bona fides of
domicile
Dobson v. Pearce
–
- Olney obtained a
judgment in a NY ct against D, a resident of Conn., based
upon a claim that was fraudulent…Olney then brought suit in
Conn. to enforce the judgment…D brought suit before same ct.
& ct. declared the judgment fraudulent & enjoined Olney from
prosecuting the action on it…Olney then made the assignment
of the judgment to P, who took it w/ knowledge of the fraud
used in procuring the judgment…P then tried to enforce in NY
-
held a foreign ct can order that a judgment
may not be enforced by the state in which it was obtained
- a ct of chancery has
the power to grant relief against judgments obtained by
fraud
- the right of P in the
judgment is personal right
- the Conn. ct has
personal JD over him & has the authority to declare the
rights of the parties in the judgment
- therefore, the
determination of the Conn. ct of the matter of fraud is
conclusive upon the parties & will be given full faith &
credit by the NY ct.
James v. Grand Trunk
Western RR Co –
counter injunction
- P, a Michigan
administrator, brought a wrongful death action in Ill. under
the Michigan statute to recover against D, an Ill. railroad
corporation, for death arising out of an accident that
occurred in Michigan…D obtained an injunction against P in
Michigan, enjoining her from proceeding w/ the Ill. action…P
appeals an order denying her motion to restrain D from
enforcing the injunction
-
held a ct, having prior JD over an action
instituted by an nonresident, does not have to recognize
another state’s injunction restraining the nonresident from
proceeding w/ that action
- also held a ct can
issue a counter injunction restraining D from enforcing its
injunction against P in the state of her residence
- neither the doctrine of
full faith & credit nor comity require compulsory
recognition of injunctions restraining a non-resident form
proceeding w/ an action in a ct having prior JD over an
action
- Michigan’s venue
statute restricting the suits against railroads to the
county in which P resides if the railroad lines traverse
that county is not controlling
- a state cannot
create a transitory cause of action & at the same time
destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action
in any ct having JD
- that JD is determined
by the law of the ct’s creation & cannot be defeated by the
extraterritorial operation of a statute of another state,
even extraterritorial operation of a stature of another
state, even though that state created the right of action
- it is well settled that
a ct has the power & duty to complete and final justice
between the parties, & may restrain proceedings in other cts
for that purpose
- in this case, even
though the injunction is directed at the parties, its
intended effect is to deprive the Ill. ct of its proper
injunction
- this ct is free to
disregard such injunctions & to issue a counter injunction
to restrain enforcement of the Michigan injunction
- the counter injunction
protects D from imprisonment for contempt from P enforcing
the Michigan injunction order
(D) STATE CT
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FEDERAL CT PROCEEDINGS
Introduction – although 28
USC section 2283 generally prohibits federal cts from
enjoining state ct
proceedings, there are no express prohibitions on state
ct’s injunctions
against federal ct proceedings
-
however, the Supreme Ct has held that state
cts do not have the power to enjoined suits brought in
federal cts
Donovan v. City of Dallas
– TX
Supreme Ct directed civil ct of appeals to enjoin P from
prosecuting their case in federal ct
- D planned to build an
additional runway to its airport & sell municipal bonds to
finance the construction….citizens filed a complaint to stop
building…later, group brought suit in federal ct to stop…TX
law prohibited issuing bonds while litigation challenging
issue…
-
held a state ct cannot restrain federal ct
proceedings in an in personam action & a judgment for
contempt cannot be upheld when the restraining order, the
violation of which is the basis of the contempt proceeding,
is invalid
- state cts are w/o
authority to restrain federal ct proceedings even in in
personam actions where the ct has JD over the subject matter
(28 USC 1331 federal question & 28 USC 1332 diversity of
citizenship) & the parties
- P’s right to have
issues decided by a federal ct has already attached & cannot
be taken away by another ct
- this is so even though
the injunction is directed at the parties & not at the ct
injunction is directed at the parties & not at the ct itself
- a state ct may not
punish a federal ct litigant for pursuing his right to seek
relief in federal ct
- in proceedings in
rem or quasi in rem the state or federal ct having custody
over the property has exclusive JD to proceed
- where the judgment
sought is in personam, both state & federal may proceed
until judgment is reached in one of them, which may be set
up as res judicata in the other
- in this case it did not
matter that the prohibition was addressed to the parties
rather than to the federal ct itself
- the ct of civil appeals
assumes that P is guilty of disobeying a valid order
- because it is unclear
whether the TX ct would have punished P for contempt if it
had known that the order violated was invalid, we leave
consideration of this question to the TX ct on remand
(E) FERERAL CT
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STATE CT PROCEEDINGS
Introduction – 28 USC
section 2283 prohibits federal ct injunctions to stay court
proceedings except:
a) when expressly authorized by
Congress
b) where necessarily in the aid of
its JD
c) or to effectuate its judgments
d)
judicial exception – where a person about to be prosecuted in
state ct can show that he will, if the proceeding in the state
ct is not enjoined, suffer irreparable harm
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
– “Federal Ct injunction vs. state ct proceedings”
-
when a federal ct has JD over subject matter
& personal, however, the exercise of JD would be
inappropriate
-
Ways for a federal ct to intervene it must
be:
1) irreparable
injury, both great & immediate injury
2) also includes
harassment, bad faith, vexations
3) a line by
line facially invalid statute, blatantly obvious,
unconst. on its
face – but it then can be brought to a
federal ct after
adjudication in the state ct
Abstention Doctrines – Younger, Pullman, Burford,
& Colorado Doctrine
Younger v. Harris
– special
circumstances not shown
- P was indicated in
state ct for violation of the Calf. Criminal Syndicalsim
Act…he filed a complaint in federal ct seeking to restrain
D, the district attorney of LA, from prosecuting him,
alleging such prosecution, and the Act itself, were in
violation of the 1st & 14th Amds. by
inhibiting his rights of free speech & press…two interveners
claimed the prosecution of P inhibited the expression of
their views advocating the policies of the Progressive Labor
Party…a 3rd intervener, a history teacher,
alleged the prosecution of P made him uncertain as to
whether he could teach about Communism doctrine…a three
judge federal ct, convened pursuant to 28 USC section 2284,
held that the state Cr. Syn. Act was void for vagueness &
overbreadth in violation of the 1st & 14th
Amd., and accordingly restrained D from prosecuting P….D
appealed
-
held that in the absence of special
circumstances, a federal ct could enjoin pending state ct
proceedings that challenged the constitutionality of a state
statute
- Absence special
circumstances, federal cts may not stay pending state ct
criminal proceedings
- in this case, P
failed to show bad faith, harassment or other unusual
circumstances that would justify equitable relief
- the ct distinguished
Dombrowshi v. Pfister, which involved substantial
allegations of (i) harassment & vexations bad faith
prosecution from which the state ct provided no relief (ii)
great & irreparable harm, from the instant case where there
was no evidence of that the prosecution of P would result in
this, necessary to justify federal ct intervention in state
ct criminal proceedings
- neither is the
existence of a “chilling effect” on 1st Amd.
rights in & of itself sufficient to prohibit state action
- a statute w/ an
incidental effect of inhibiting free speech can be upheld if
such effect is minor in relation to the need for control of
the conduct
- the other parties had
no standing to bring suit; there must be an actually case or
controversy
- if there is not
adequate remedy at law irreparable harm may result
- Our Federalism
– represents a system where there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both the state & federal govt.; the
federal govt. although it is always anxious to vindicate &
protect federal rights & interests will not unduly interfere
w/ the legitimate activities of the state; usually the
interest must be irreparable which is both great & immediate
- vagueness & overbreath
are two of the biggest problems w/ state statute
- Summary – abstention
is appropriate in a state criminal proceedings, absent bad
faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute,
great & immediate irreparable harm; the possible
unconstitutionality of a statute on its face is not
sufficient
O’Shea v. Littleton –
injury must
be real & immediate
- P & others brought a
civil rights action on behalf of a class of citizens of
Cairo, Ill. against several officials, including D & others,
alleging racial discrimination in the adm. of the criminal
justice system in violation of their const. rights…P alleged
the discrimination treatment was intentionally designed to
deter the class form engaging in boycotts & other
activities…the complaint also alleged there was no adequate
remedy at law & sought injunctive relief…
-
held a federal ct cannot grant an injunction
against a state ct judge based upon allegations of racially
discriminatory conduct
- abstract injury is
not enough…P must allege some actual or threatened direct
injury…such injury must be “real & immediate” &
“conjectural”
- past exposure to
illegal conduct does not in itself evidence a present case
or controversy for purposes of granting injunctive relief
- even if this case did
present a present case or controversy, P has failed to
satisfy the threshold requirements for injunctive relief of
immediate irreparable injury & lack of adequate remedy at
law
- this case fails to
allege an actual case or controversy as required by Art. 3
of Const. that those who seek to invoke the power of federal
cts must allege an actual case or controversy
-
Basic doctrine of equity is that cts of
equity should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution:
(1) when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law &
(2) will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief
- additional recognition
of the need for a proper balance in the concurrent operation
of federal & state cts counsel restraint against injunctions
against state officers engaged in the administration of
state criminal laws in the absence of a showing of great &
immediate irreparable injury
- this case is an
extension of Younger
- Adequate Remedies at
Law in this case:
(1) right to a substitute judge
(2) change in venue
(3) review on direct appeal or on post
conviction collateral
review
(3)
the
opportunity to demonstrate the conduct of these
judicial officers is so prejudicial to the adm.
of
justice that available disciplinary proceedings,
including the possibility of suspension or
removal,
are warranted
(4)
federal habeas corpus relief
Statutes which the Supreme
Ct has recognized constitute express exception to the policy of
nonintervention in state proceedings enunciated by the
anti-injunction state:
(a)
S1983
(b)
Bankruptcy Act
(c)
Interpleader Act
ect…….
Huffman v. Persue
–
application of Younger to civil cases
- D, the local sheriff,
started a nuisance proceeding against a movie theater that
displayed pornographic films…state ct determined the theater
displayed obscene movies & could be closed…instead of
appealing, P sued in federal ct…claiming D’s use of the
nuisance statute deprived P of its const. rights…federal ct
determined the statute was overbroad & enjoined the state
ct’s judgment
-
held a federal ct can intervene in a state ct
civil proceeding that involves a claim of a violation of
federal const. rights
- whenever federal cts
are asked to interfere w/ state civil functions, they must
exercise more restraint than in ordinary private equity
cases
- such interferences w/
state judicial proceedings prevents states from effectuating
state policies & from providing a forum for vindication of
const. objections
- the aspect of the
Younger principle that pertains to the threat to the federal
system is applicable to civil proceedings just as much as it
is criminal proceedings
- the other aspect of
Younger, which reflects the reluctance of equity cts to
interfere w/ criminal prosecutions, does not generally apply
to civil cases
- in this case, however,
D used a civil proceeding that was closely related to
criminal statutes prohibiting the display of obscene
material
- P asserts that Younger
properly applies to criminal cases in which the D may pursue
habeas corpus after exhausting state ct remedies, but that
because there are no similar protections for civil litigants
- Younger should not
apply
- the availability of
federal review was not a basis for the Younger rule
- even though P could
appeal from an ultimate state ct determination, the point of
federalism
- hence, the district ct
should have applied Younger in determining whether to
consider the merits of P’s case
- P’s claims that because
the state trial ct had entered it final judgment, there was
no longer a pending state ct proceeding as required by
Younger
- But the Younger
principle requires P to exhaust his state appellate remedies
before seeking federal relief, unless one of the arrow
Younger exceptions applies, such as a case involving a
statute that flagrantly & patently violates an express
const. prohibition
- one remand, the
district ct must apply Younger rule
- the ct noted, but did
not rule on, the premise behind P’s argument….that every
litigant who asserts a federal claim is entitled to have it
decided on the merits by a federal, rather than a state, ct
- the ct simply noted
that even if this premise was correct, it would only apply
at the completion of the state ct proceedings where the
claim was first asserted
- It is no longer true
that any civil litigant may seek review in the Supreme Ct of
federal claims properly asserted & rejected by state cts
- Summary – abstention
is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a
patently invalid state statute, federal JD has been invoked
for the purpose of restraining state nuisance proceedings
antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at
obtaining the closure of places exhibiting obscene films
- Patently Invalid
– implies the challenged statute is violative of express
const. prohibitions in every clause, sentence, & paragraphs,
& in whatever manner & against whomever an effort might be
made to apply it
Ohio Civil Rights Comm.
v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc –
mother
should stay at home w/ children case
- teacher fired for
violating the dispute resolution agreement…teacher
complained to Ohio Civil Rights Comm., which initiated
administrative proceedings….P sought an injunction against
D’s proceeding, claiming such proceedings violated P’s
freedom of religion….
-
held the federal cts should abstain from
granting injunctive relief against state adm. proceedings
- P claims that D’s
abstention argument was waived when D stipulated that the
district ct had JD….however, abstention does not arise from
lack of JD, but from principles of comity & federalism
- normally, federal cts
should abstain when asked to enjoin pending proceedings in
state cts
- the Younger
principle is not limited to state ct proceedings….It applies
as well to state adm. proceedings involving important state
interests, provided the federal plaintiff such as P would
have a full & fair opportunity to litigate the const. claims
during the course of the proceedings
- In this case,
elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is an important
state interest…
- in addition, P will
receive an adequate opportunity to raise is constitutional
claims…the mere fact of D’s exercise of JD over P does not
alone require federal ct intervention, because even
religious schools are subject to some state regulation…D may
investigate to determine whether the teacher was in fact
discharged for P’s religious reasons
- the adm. agency did not
determine substantive rights; only an investigative agency;
state ct judicial review was permitted, but not necessarily
authorized
- Younger was applied to
a civil action
-
Summary:
(1)
show great &
immediate irreparable harm & we will step in
(2)
the state had a
“serious dog in this fight”
Orleans Public Service,
Inc v. Council of City of New Orleans
– no
abstention from state legislative-type proceedings
- P was a producer,
wholesaler & retailer of electricity that participated in a
“power pool” w/ three other similar companies…all four were
owned by Middle South Utilities…..& all four agreed to
finance the construction of two nuclear plants for a total
cost of 1.2 billion…decreased demand led to suspension of
one plant; completion of other was over 3 billion…the FERC
determined the at P should pay 17% of the nuclear plant’s
cost…the Council of City of New Orleans determined it would
allow P to set rates sufficient to recover all but 135
million of the costs, on the ground that P was negligent in
not diversifying its energy supply portfolio by selling some
of the nuclear power…earlier decisions of the Supreme Ct had
held that states had to comply w/ FERC’s allocations of
wholesale power in setting intrastate retail rates…once it
received D’s decree, P sought declaratory & injunctive
relief in federal district ct.
-
held a federal district ct can not abstain
from exercising JD over a utility’s petition for injunctive
relief from the state’s ratemaking authority rate order in
deference to the state review process
- the district ct clearly
had JD to hear P’s claim & generally federal cts may not
abstain from exercise of its JD once conferred, because
Congress, not the cts, defines the scope of federal JD
- still federal cts may
apply common law principles in determining whether to
grant certain types of relief
- in Burford v. Sun
Oil, the ct held that federal cts acting in equity could,
but do not have to, abstain where timely & adequate state ct
review is available so long as:
(1)
there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar, or
(2)
the
exercise of federal review of the question in the case & in
similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to est. a
coherent policy w/ respect to a matter of substantial public
concern
·
the federal cts applied Burford
here, apparently because the case involved state regulatory law
& policy
·
but P’s claim that D is prohibited
by federal law from refusing to provide reimbursement for
FERC-allocated wholesale costs does not implicate the state got
process or policies
·
abstention is not required
merely because resolution of a federal question may overturn a
state policy
·
the inquiry in this case is limited
to the four corners of D’s retail order to determine whether it
is preempted by FERC’s allocation decree
·
Adjudication does not demand
significant familiarity w/, and will not disrupt state
resolution of, distinctively local regulatory facts or policies,
so Burford was improperly applied
·
P claims that Younger should not
apply because Younger does not require abstention when there is
a substantial claim that the challenged state action is
completely preempted by federal law, but the state has an
interest in conducting its ratemaking proceedings, & P’s claim
is the same one made in Younger, ie…that the allegedly
unconstitutional state statue was not a proper subject of
prosecution
·
P also claims that abstention was
improper because the case falls w/in the Younger exception for
irreparable injury, such as where the state action flagrantly
violates const. prohibitions. But D merely determined that D
was negligent in failing to diversify its supply portfolio, &
that P’s shareholders, not its rate payers, should pay for the
negligence…nothing in this decision is foreclosed by federal law
·
P’s claim can succeed only if the
state ct action is not the type of proceeding to which Younger
applies.
·
Younger has never been applied
to state judicial proceedings reviewing legislative or executive
action; it has been applied only to criminal prosecutions, civil
enforcement proceedings, & civil proceedings in furtherance of
state ct’s ability to perform their judicial functions
·
D’s proceedings is not judicial in
nature, however, it was legislative, and even though state ct
review was available, P did not have to exercise that options
prior to its federal action
·
therefore, P’s federal suit did not
interfere w/ ongoing state judicial proceedings, and abstention
was improper
·
another basis for federal
abstention arises when difficult & unsettled questions of state
law must be resolved before a substantial federal const.
question can be decided
·
state ct review was not an
extension of the legislative process…if it had been Younger
would have applied
Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman
·
abstention is appropriate in cases presenting a federal const.
issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture
by a state ct determination of pertinent state law
·
the ct should abstain when there
is a difficult & unsettled questions of state law which must be
involved before a substantial federal const. question can be
decided
·
if the state statute is facially
invalid the federal ct can jump in
·
unlike Younger or Burford
abstentions, Pullman abstention generally results in a stay
rather than the dismissal of the federal action pending the
outcome of state ct proceedings
·
federal ct should abstain from
decisions when difficult & unsettled questions of state law must
be resolved before a substantial federal const. question can be
Burford v. Sun Oil
-
in Burford v. Sun Oil, the ct held that
federal cts acting in equity
could,
but do not have to, abstain where timely & adequate state ct
review is available so long as:
-
Abstention is appropriate where:
(1)
there are
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result
in the case then at bar, or
(2)
the exercise of
federal review of the question in the case & in similar cases
would be disruptive of state efforts to est. a coherent policy
w/ respect to a matter of substantial public concern
·
the state had est. its won
elaborate review system for dealing w/ the geological
complexities of oil & gas fields
·
federal interference would have
had an impermissible disruptive effect on state policy for the
management of those fields
Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. US
·
concerned dispute over water rights
in Colorado, which had divided state into water districts
·
US got brought case on behalf of
Indians
·
District 7 Water District filed in
Federal District ct
·
to be a matter of abstention must
have 2 actions: 1 in federal ct & 1 in state ct
·
as soon as action filed in federal
ct – there was an action filed in state court – federal ct
dismissed on Doctrine of Abstention
·
ct of appeals reversed – District
Ct should not have abstained, should have heard case – then
appealed to Supreme Ct
·
issue was whether the McKaren Amd.
had an effect on federal ct. JD (grants state cts rights,
authorizing to hear these cases, even if federal ct. has an
issue here)
·
held that McKaren Amd. did not
override fed. ct’s authority to hear these cases
·
ct’s reasoning – 1) looked at the plain language of Amd /
nothing in McKaren expressly suggests state cts have original JD
in these cases. 2) looks to history. 3) there is no presumption
given here
·
had concurrent JD here
·
2nd
Issue – whether federal ct should abstain where there is
concurrent JD
·
ct
states again abstention in the exception & not the rule
·
unless it falls under three areas
of abstention, there is no abstention
How does ct go about determining need for
abstention:
(1)
Look at Pullman - is there a Federal Const. issue
(2)
Look at Burford – difficult question of state law…federal review
would be disruptive of state efforts to est. policy
(3)
Look at Younger – is it a criminal proceeding…extended to civil
case if involved important state issue
The Colorado River Doctrine
is a catch all – held Fed’s should abstain
·
federal ct may refuse to decide a
case to avoid duplicative proceedings when the same issues are
pending in state ct
·
While the general rule is that
the tendency of an action in the state ct is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the federal ct having
JD, the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation
·
the circumstances permitting the
dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent
state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial adm. are
considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriated
for abstention
·
Factors used to make this determination:
(1)
inconvenience of
the federal forum
(2)
desirability of
avoiding piecemeal litigation
(3)
order in which
JD was obtained by the concurrent forums
(4)
whether the case
is governed by state or federal law
(5)
the probable
inadequacy of the state ct proceeding to protect the federal P’s
rights
·
abstention from the exercise of
federal JD is the exception not the rule
·
ct’s reasoning – 1) looked at the
plain language of Amd / nothing in McKaren expressly suggest
state cts have original JD in these cases. 2) looks to history.
3) there is no presumption given here
·
had concurrent JD here
·
2nd Issue – whether
federal ct should abstain where there is concurrent JD
Rizzo v. Goode
–
interference w/ operations of local agencies
·
a group of individuals representing
members of a class of Philadelphia residents & a class of
minority citizens alleged a pattern of unconst. mistreatment by
police officers directed at the citizens of Philadelphia, in
general, & at minority citizens, in particular…trials were held
& ct ordered P to submit to it a program for improving the
handling of complaints to police misconduct…
·
held that citizens do not have a mandatory federal equitable
relief when a state agency fails to institute steps to reduce
the incidence of unconst. police misconduct
·
important considerations of
federalism weigh heavily against the intrusion of federal equity
power upon the procedures of state agencies
·
the availability & scope of federal
equitable relief against an agency of local govt. is very
limited
·
such relief can be granted only in
the most extraordinary circumstances
·
the officers actually harming the
citizens were not named in the complaint
·
here the district ct found that
none of the petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of
any rights secured under the Const.; judicial powers may
exercised only on the basis of a const. violation; this case
presented no occasion for the district ct to grant equitable
relief against the petitioners
·
thus, the principles of federalism
which play an important part in governing the relationship
between federal cts & state govts., while having their greatest
weight in cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal
prosecution in progress, have not been limited to that situation
·
these principles likewise have
applicability where injunctive relief is sought, not against the
judicial branch of the got, but against the judicial branch of
the state govt., but against those in charge of an executive
branch of an agency of state or local govts. such as respondents
here
Missouri v. Jenkins
– students
sue over segregation in public schools
·
Rule – fed. ct decrees exceed
appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition
that does not violate the Const. or flow form a violation & they
must take into account the interests of the state & local
authorities in managing affairs consistent w/ Const.
·
held a federal district ct can not increase local property taxes
to ensure funding for desegregation of public schools pursuant
to the ct’s desegregation order
·
district ct. re-aligned KCMSD to
make it a D, rather than a P – was a friendly advocate
·
originally 25 school districts were
predominantly black, 43 were not
·
Vestiges – anything that gave the
appearance of discrimination or segregation
·
federal district ct tried to
reverse “white flight”
·
comity is not present when the
district ct has been involved for 17 years
·
unitary school district – fair to
all races
·
O’Conner – looked at part 2 of
test; just because there is a predominate race in the school
does not mean that there is a problem; there may be other
demographical reasons for this
·
Thomas – just because the school is
predominantly black does not mean inferiority; distinguish this
from the Brown statement that said that “separate is inherently
evil”
·
when ct exercises JD in equity:
(1)
it
should exercise discretion soundly
(2)
it
should not go above & beyond what is needed to remedy the
problems
(3)
the
injunction should reflect sound discretion
Segregation – (act or process of separation)
(1)
de jure – that intended by law
(2)
de facto – segregation in fact
ABSTENTION DOCTRINES
Younger Abstention
(A)
Absent special circumstances, federal cts may not stay pending
or ongoing state ct criminal proceedings, state nuisance
proceedings antecedent to state criminal proceedings, & state
adm. proceedings (Colorado River)
(B)
Civil – the state proceeding must involve important state
interests which typically look to state law for their resolution
(Ohio Civil Rights)
(C)
Exceptions:
1)
where there would be great & immediate irreparable harm
(Dombrowski)
2)
where there are allegations of harassment & vexations or
retaliatory prosecution from which the state provided no relief
3)
where there would not be an adequate opportunity in the state to
raise & have timely decided the federal const. issues (Gibson)
4)
where the state law at issue is patently & flagrantly wrong in
every particular (Huffman)
5)
where state judicial proceedings are reviewing legislative or
executive action (NOPSI)
(D)
Unless one of the exceptions applies, P is required to exhaust
his state appellate remedies before seeking federal relief
(Huffman)
Pullman Abstention
(A)
Abstention is appropriate in cases presenting a federal const.
issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture
by a state ct determination or pertinent state law
(B)
Specifies:
(1)
there is substantial uncertainty as to the meaning of the state
law (cases touches a sensitive area of state social policy0
(2)
there is a reasonable probability that the state ct
clarification of the state law might make unnecessary the need
for a federal const. ruling
(3)
while in state ct the P needs to advise the state ct of the
existence of the federal issue, so the state ct can apply the
state issue w/ the federal issue in mind
Burford Abstention
(A)
Abstention is appropriate when:
(1)
there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the results in the case then at bar, or
(2)
the
exercise of federal review of the question in the case & in
similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to est. a
coherent policy w/ respect to a matter of substantial public
concern
(B)
Specifies:
(1)
usually the case involves complex issues of fact or state law
(2)
the
issues usually are handled by special state judicial or adm.
tribunals because of its transcendental effects & to assure
uniformity w/ respect to important state interests
Colorado River
(A)
A
federal ct may refuse to decide a case to avoid duplicate
proceedings when the same issues are pending in state ct
(B)
This determination is bases on analysis of the following
factors:
(1)
inconvenience of the federal forum
(2)
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation
(3)
the
order in which JD was obtained by the concurrent forums
(4)
whether the case is governed by state or federal law
(5)
the
probable inadequacy of the state ct proceeding to protect
federal P’s rights
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